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CORPORATE CONTROL, DUAL CLASS, AND THE LIMITS 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Zohar Goshen*  & Assaf Hamdani** 
Companies with a dual-class structure have increasingly been 
involved in high-profile battles over the reallocation of control rights. 
Google, for instance, sought to entrench its founders’ control by recapital-
izing from a dual-class into a triple-class structure. The CBS board, in 
contrast, attempted to dilute its controlling shareholder by distributing a 
voting stock dividend that would empower minority shareholders to block 
a merger it perceived to be harmful. These cases raise a fundamental 
question at the heart of corporate law: What is the proper judicial 
response to self-dealing claims regarding reallocations of corporate control 
rights? 
This Article shows that the reallocation of control rights raises an 
inevitable tradeoff between investors’ protection from agency costs and the 
controller’s ability to pursue its idiosyncratic vision, making the value of 
different allocations of control rights both firm specific and individual 
specific. It is thus inherently impossible to create objective valuation mod-
els for the reallocation of control rights. The impossibility of creating reli-
able valuation models sets the limits of judicial review: The legal tools 
long used by Delaware courts to adjudicate conflicts over cash-flow rights, 
such as entire fairness review, are fundamentally incompatible with the 
adjudication of conflicts over reallocations of control rights. This Article 
explores the policy implications of this insight and suggests that courts 
treat reallocations of control rights as questions of charter interpretation 
as to who has the power to decide such reallocations and avoid reviewing 
the discretion to use that power. Courts should enforce the decision of the 
parties as to reallocations of control rights and apply the business judg-
ment rule when the charter is silent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, Google’s board approved a proposal amending Google’s 
charter to authorize the issuance of a new class of nonvoting Class C stock.1 
Prior to this proposed recapitalization, Google’s capital structure was com-
prised of one-vote-per-share Class A shares, primarily held by public share-
holders, and ten-votes-per-share Class B shares, primarily held by Google’s 
 
 1. Steven Davidoff Solomon, New Share Class Gives Google Founders Tighter 
Control, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Apr. 13, 2012), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/ 
13/new-share-class-gives-google-founders-tighter-control (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). 
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founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin.2 Under this dual-class structure,3 
Google had the ability to raise capital, incentivize employees, and acquire 
other corporations by issuing Class A shares, while preserving control over 
the company in the hands of Class B shareholders. However, this strategy 
faced an upper limit—if enough Class A shares were issued, eventually the 
voting power of Class B shares would be diluted to the point of the found-
ers losing control.4 
Google’s authorization of Class C shares was a strategic response to 
this unwelcome hiccup: After the recapitalization, Google would be able 
to issue as many Class C shares as it deemed necessary for business pur-
poses, without ever threatening to dilute the founders’ control.5 This 
move, therefore, reallocated control rights from the public shareholders to 
the company founders, and enabled them to keep their control over the 
company even as it continued to issue new shares. Of course, the recapi-
talization required board approval and a shareholder vote to amend the 
company’s charter.6 But these procedures offered little meaningful protec-
tion because Page and Brin held a majority of voting rights. Thus, the char-
ter amendment could be, and in fact was, approved with the two founders’ 
votes, and against the objection of Class A common shareholders—even 
though Page and Brin were clearly self-interested.7 
 
 2. See Google Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23–24 (Jan. 29, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1288776/000119312513028362/d452134d10k.
htm [https://perma.cc/5H4D-UMX4]; see also Paul Lee, Protecting Public Shareholders: 
The Case of Google’s Recapitalization, 5 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 281, 283 (2015). 
 3. See Anita Anand, Complexities in Firms with Dual Class Shares, 3 Annals Corp. 
Governance 184, 193 (2018) (defining “dual-class shares” as a type of capital structure 
involving “the issuance of two or more different classes of shares whereby one class (the 
‘superior’ class) has more voting rights than shares held, while the other class (the ‘subor-
dinate’ class) has fewer voting rights relative to the shares held”). 
 4. To understand the intuition, assume that at the start there were 100 Class A shares 
and 100 Class B shares. Since Class B has 10 times the votes of Class A, the founders would 
have 1,000 votes and the public would only have 100 votes (almost 91% of the voting rights 
was in the hands of the founders). But if over time the number of Class A shares increased 
and reached 1,000 shares, then both classes of shares would have 1,000 votes (only 50% of 
the voting rights would accrue to the founders). From then on, any increase in the number 
of Class A shares would leave the founders with fewer than 50% of the votes. 
 5. Google Settlement Means Stock-Split Can Proceed, CBS News (June 17, 2013), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/google-settlement-means-stock-split-can-proceed [https:// 
perma.cc/9YQ5-PGGP] (“By creating a new class of non-voting shares, Google will be able 
to keep rewarding other employees with more stock and financing potential acquisitions of 
stock without undermining the voting power of Page and Brin.”). 
 6. See Geeyoung Min, Shareholder Voice in Corporate Charter Amendments, 43 J. 
Corp. L. 289, 294 (2018) (“Under both the Model Business Corporation Act and the corpo-
rate law of all 50 states, including the Delaware General Corporation Law, amending a cor-
porate charter requires both directors’ and shareholders’ approvals.”). 
 7. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Google’s Stock Settlement May Not Do Much for 
Shareholders, N.Y. Times: Dealbook (Sept. 11, 2013), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/09/11/googles-stock-settlement-may-not-do-much-for-shareholders (on file with the 
944 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:941 
 
Class A shareholders swiftly responded to the recapitalization by 
bringing a breach of fiduciary duty lawsuit in Delaware.8 The plaintiffs 
argued that the recapitalization was a form of “self-dealing” that should be 
reviewed under Delaware’s long-standing regime of entire fairness.9 The 
Google defendants, however, claimed that the decision ought to receive 
the deferential business judgment protection.10 Ultimately, the parties set-
tled the dispute on the eve of the trial.11 The Google litigation thus left 
unanswered the key doctrinal question as to whether entire fairness, busi-
ness judgment, or some intermediate level of scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard of review for “midstream” reallocations of control rights—that is, 
changes to a company’s existing allocation of control rights.12 
Subsequent to the Google settlement, several other dual-class firms 
announced midstream recapitalizations from dual-class to triple-class 
structures. First, Facebook and InterActiveCorp (IAC) proposed to create 
a new class of nonvoting stock through a charter amendment.13 However, 
after being targeted with suits by their respective shareholders, who argued 
that these recapitalizations amounted to unfair self-dealing, both 
Facebook and IAC withdrew their proposed recapitalization plans.14 
Another company adopted a more cautious approach, and structured the 
recapitalization ex ante in a way that complied with the entire fairness 
review.15 Lastly, the board of CBS Corporation (CBS), also a dual-class com-
pany, recently proposed to unilaterally reallocate control rights from the 
controlling shareholder to the public shareholders—rather than, as its 
 
Columbia Law Review) (“Only about 12.7 percent of Google’s Class A stockholders . . . voted 
in support of issuing the Class C stock. That’s a pretty poor showing by any measure.”). 
 8. See Plaintiffs’ Opening Pretrial Brief, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 
7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728583. 
 9. Id. at 32 (“Self-dealing is present where, as here, special benefits from a potential 
transaction flow to the controller.”). 
 10. See infra note 90 and accompanying text. 
 11. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *29, In re Google Inc. Class C 
S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“We settled 
on the eve of trial, literally on the eve of trial.”). 
 12. See id. at *37 (describing the case as “interesting and novel” such that then-
Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. thought “it would be hazardous for anyone to predict how it 
would have come out”). 
 13. See Facebook Inc., Schedule 14A Information: Proxy Statement Pursuant to 
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 55–73 (May 2016) [hereinafter 
Facebook, May 2016 Proxy Statement], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/ 
000132680116000053/facebook2016prelimproxysta.htm [https://perma.cc/48JQ-5SP3]; 
IAC/InterActiveCorp, Schedule 14A Information: Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 
14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, at 16 (Nov. 2016), http://ir.iac.com/static-
files/409d5e1a-a42c-4af9-a6ed-8dd9ad20feb4 [https://perma.cc/Y35V-ZHNQ]. 
 14. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 15. See IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *6–
9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) (noting that “entire fairness review” would apply to the plaintiff’s 
claim); see also infra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
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predecessors had done, from the public shareholders to the controller.16 
In the face of what it viewed as a merger proposal that would harm the 
company, the board announced its plan to dilute the controller by distrib-
uting voting shares as a stock dividend to all classes of shares (voting and 
nonvoting), thereby empowering the minority shareholders to block the 
merger.17 Yet again, the resulting suit ended in settlement.18 
These cases raise a fundamental question of corporate law: What is 
the appropriate standard of review for conflicts over the reallocation of 
control rights at controlled companies?19 This question has not been 
explored,20 and it is far from an obscure academic inquiry. Recapitaliza-
tions like Google’s are likely to recur as controlled companies that go pub-
lic continue to employ multiclass share structures, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of future recapitalizations and other midstream reallocation of 
control rights.21 Yet, while a long line of Delaware case law has addressed 
disputes over various forms of midstream reallocations of control rights,22 
the Delaware courts have not yet adopted a clear approach concerning the 
standard of review that applies to these reallocations of control rights.23 
 
 16. See CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, 
at *2 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). The plan would have diluted the controller’s voting power 
from approximately 80% to about 17%. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. See CBS Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at exh. 10(a) (Sept. 9, 2018), https:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000119312518269601/d622048dex10a.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5T4U-V4XF]. 
 19. By “controlled company,” this Article refers to those companies whose shareholder 
base is such that one shareholder owns a majority of the company’s voting stock. 
 20. In his article on hostile takeovers, Ron Gilson argues that courts lack competence 
to determine whether it is “fair” to leave control with management or the bidder. See 
Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive 
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 824–27 (1981). Gilson, however, does not 
address conflicts over the reallocation of control rights in controlled companies. Moreover, 
he explains that the problem with fairness review of control contests is that courts lack the 
competence to review what are essentially business decisions. See id. at 827 (arguing that 
such a fairness inquiry “raises the same issue of judicial competence which justifies a restric-
tive judicial role with respect to the duty of care”). By contrast, this Article posits that the 
problem is the absence of acceptable methodologies for valuing control rights. 
 21. See Blair Nicholas & Brandon Marsh, Dual-Class: The Consequences of Depriving 
Institutional Investors of Corporate Voting Rights, Harv. Law Sch. Forum on Corp. 
Governance (May 17, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/05/17/dual-class-the-
consequences-of-depriving-institutional-investors-of-corporate-voting-rights [https://perma.cc/ 
TKC2-HSAA] (noting a continuing trend of “issuing dual-class or multi-class stock”). 
 22. See infra section I.B. 
 23. Even if parties to recapitalization litigation continue to settle their disputes, the 
correct standard of review remains central for bargaining at the settlement stage. In particu-
lar, uncertainty in the case law risks not only inaccurate assessments of the strength of cases 
but also increased aversion to pursuing midstream recapitalizations at all. For instance, 
Facebook not only paid a huge sum of money in attorney’s fees but also withdrew its recapi-
talization altogether. Jef Feeley & Sarah Frier, Facebook to Pay $67.5 Million in Fees in Suit 
over Shares, Bloomberg: Technology (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2018-10-24/facebook-to-pay-67-5-million-in-fees-in-non-voting-shares-suit (on file with 
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The doctrinal confusion, this Article argues, is driven by a fundamen-
tal shortcoming of corporate law. Delaware critically relies on fiduciary 
duties and judicial review under the entire fairness standard to govern self-
dealing and other conflicts of interest at both controlled and widely held 
companies. This Article shows, however, that the legal framework that gov-
erns self-dealing24—the entire fairness analysis—cannot and should not be 
applied to conflicts over the reallocation of control rights. Entire fairness 
review requires courts to make an objective determination of the “fair 
price” of the transaction at issue.25 Economists have developed valuation 
models for many types of cash-flow rights, like specific assets and entire 
companies, that aid courts in determining fair price.26 Similar economic 
models for valuing the reallocation of control rights simply do not exist.27 
Moreover, this Article posits that developing an economic model that 
objectively values the reallocation of corporate control rights is an inher-
ently futile task because the value of control rights is firm specific and 
individual specific. The allocation of control rights raises an inevitable 
tradeoff between investors’ protection from agency costs and the control-
ler’s ability to pursue its idiosyncratic vision,28 thus making the value of 
different allocations of control rights both firm specific and individual 
specific. Economic theory is capable of abstracting away from specific 
attributes of an asset (such as a factory) in order to approximate the value 
of that asset. Yet economic theory cannot abstract away from the specific 
firm and the specific personality of a controller (such as Mark Zuckerberg 
 
the Columbia Law Review). It is the latter distortion in the settlement process that poses the 
greatest danger. See infra note 98. 
 24. See infra section I.A. CBS was an exceptional case that did not raise concerns for 
self-dealing by a controlling shareholder but rather a conflicted action by the board. See 
infra note 109 and accompanying text. 
 25. Under so-called “entire fairness” review, defendants face the burden of establishing 
both (1) a fair price for the disputed transaction and (2) a fair process (“fair dealing”) 
followed by the defendant board in considering and approving the disputed transaction. 
See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). 
 26. See infra section I.A.1. 
 27. A look at the table of contents of the leading corporate finance textbooks reveals 
that there is no chapter about valuation of control rights. See, e.g., Richard A. Brealey, 
Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance (12th ed. 2017); 
Stephen A. Ross, Randolph W. Westerfield & Bradford D. Jordan, Fundamentals of 
Corporate Finance (12th ed. 2018). Section II.B.2, infra, discusses the studies that attempt 
to overcome the absence of a method to evaluate control rights and explains why these 
methods do not even purport to value the effect of control by a specific individual over a 
specific company. 
 28. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 
125 Yale L.J. 560, 617 (2016) [hereinafter Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision]. That 
article assumes that entrepreneurs value control because it allows them to pursue their 
vision. For other explanations for why control of public corporations may be valuable to 
controllers, see generally Ronald Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate 
Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (2006) 
(arguing that controlling shareholders are driven by nonpecuniary private benefits, rather 
than pecuniary benefits of control). 
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or Sergei Brin) without excluding from the valuation analysis the very 
specific characteristics that make control valuable in that particular con-
troller’s hands.29 
Without a reliable valuation model, Delaware’s entire fairness frame-
work breaks down: Not only will ex post judicial determinations of “fair 
price” be impeded by the impossibility of reliably pricing corporate con-
trol rights, but also ex ante attempts to secure minority shareholder 
approval will be thwarted by the lack of a reliable valuation backstop.30 
Negotiating in the shadow of the law is impossible when the parties cannot 
reliably estimate how a court will determine a fair price. 
In light of the impossibility of valuing control rights—and consequent 
courts’ inability to apply entire fairness review—how should courts regu-
late conflicts over reallocation of control rights? This Article argues that 
Delaware should resolve control rights conflicts by determining, as a 
matter of contractual interpretation, which party has the authority to real-
locate control rights under the company’s charter.31 The parties—control-
lers and minority shareholders—are best left to agree ex ante on the voting 
rule that will govern midstream reallocations of control rights. Therefore, 
courts’ principal task should be to determine whether the controller can 
reallocate control rights without receiving the approval of the minority 
shareholders. Delaware courts should then defer to the arrangements on 
which the parties had initially agreed and forgo any attempt to evaluate 
the fairness of reallocation of control rights.32 As long as the charter grants 
the controller the power to reallocate control rights, courts should apply 
the business judgment rule to a controller’s choice to recapitalize. All 
other methods will fail in the absence of objective valuations. 
This approach not only avoids costly litigation and the valuation issues 
implicated by control rights but also encourages clear drafting of the ini-
tial allocation of control rights in the corporate charter. And if the charter 
is silent, courts should craft a default rule that balances the potential loss 
of idiosyncratic vision (which results from giving the minority reallocation 
authority) with the potential increase of agency costs (which results from 
 
 29. See infra section II.B; cf. Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal Costs: A New 
Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 767, 811 (2017) (“If firms 
were identical . . . then any reallocation of control rights between investors and managers 
would increase one type of cost and decrease the other type by equal amounts . . . . [O]nly 
when firms have different attributes [do] differences in governance structures matter, as 
each firm aims at finding its optimal structure.”). 
 30. See infra section III.A.1. 
 31. See infra section III.B. 
 32. Applications of contract law principles are not uncommon in the corporate law 
space. In particular, the rights of bondholders in Delaware have traditionally been resolved 
as a matter of contract interpretation. See, e.g., Dale B. Tauke, Should Bonds Have More 
Fun?: A Reexamination of the Debate over Corporate Bondholder Rights, 1989 Colum. Bus. 
L. Rev. 1, 8 (“In determining what rights and protections holders of publicly issued bonds 
of solvent corporations have against adverse corporate action, courts have traditionally 
looked to contract law.”). 
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giving the controller reallocation authority).33 More specifically, 
Delaware’s longstanding pre-Google precedents, studies of market perfor-
mance, and changing market realities in public companies’ shareholder 
power all weigh in favor of preserving the traditional default rule that pro-
tects against the loss of idiosyncratic vision by granting controllers business 
judgment rule protection in decisions of midstream reallocations of 
control.34 
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the 
Delaware case law on resolving cash-flow and control rights disputes in 
controlled companies. While Delaware has developed a clear, sophisti-
cated governing regime to adjudicate cash-flow rights, in the case of 
control rights conflicts, Delaware has struggled and ultimately been incon-
sistent in its approach. Part II explains this inconsistency by demonstrating 
the inevitable tradeoff that underlies the allocation of control rights. 
Moreover, Part II explains why developing a reliable methodology for val-
uing reallocations of control rights is a futile task that will make the appli-
cation of Delaware’s existing corporate law regime impossible. In light of 
the foregoing insights, Part III considers how courts should approach con-
flicts over control rights in controlled companies and ultimately proposes 
that courts resolve these conflicts through interpretation of the company 
charter. 
I.  CASH-FLOW RIGHTS, CONTROL RIGHTS, AND CORPORATE LAW 
An important goal of corporate law is to protect public investors in 
controlled companies from opportunistic self-dealing by a controlling 
shareholder.35 Delaware relies on its expert courts to restrict self-dealing, 
and these courts have developed a sophisticated doctrinal framework for 
that purpose.36 This Part describes the application of this framework to two 
types of disputes between controllers and minority shareholders: (1) dis-
putes concerning the allocation of cash-flow rights; and (2) disputes 
concerning the allocation of control rights, including midstream recapi-
talizations. While courts and commentators have emphasized the need to 
 
 33. See infra Part II. 
 34. See infra section III.B.2. 
 35. See Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. Fin. Econ. 430, 430–31 (2008) 
(describing the increasing emphasis of academics on corporate self-dealing over the last 
twenty years); Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: 
Ex Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review, 169 J. Institutional & 
Theoretical Econ. 160, 180–81 (2013) (arguing that ex post judicial review of transactions 
with controlling shareholders or their affiliates is superior to ex ante limits on dual-class and 
other leveraged control structures). 
 36. For a critique of the proposed European regime on self-dealing transactions, see 
Luca Enriques, Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (with 
a Critique of the European Commission Proposal), 16 Eur. Bus. Org. L. Rev. 1, 25–31 (2015). 
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constrain self-dealing, they have not examined the distinction between 
conflicts over cash-flow rights and control rights and its implications. 
Section I.A explains that Delaware courts have generally applied the 
entire fairness standard of review to conflicts over cash-flow rights. Section 
I.B shows that Delaware courts, when addressing conflicts over control 
rights, have not followed a uniform approach, thereby creating uncer-
tainty over the law governing those conflicts. The overview in this Part not 
only illuminates some of the more puzzling pieces of Delaware’s corporate 
law doctrine but also frames the argument that the legal tools governing 
the reallocation of cash-flow rights should not apply to reallocations of 
control rights. 
A. Cash-Flow Rights 
Cash-flow rights determine who will receive a corporation’s economic 
value, such as its profits and capital gains, as well as how much value they 
will receive and when they will receive it.37 Disputes over the allocation of 
cash-flow rights in controlled companies arise when the controlling and 
minority shareholders disagree as to the proper allocation of value precip-
itated by the business. Generally speaking, cash-flow rights conflicts involve 
either a transaction in which the controller stands on one side and the con-
trolled corporation on the other or an action taken by the corporation that 
results in reallocation of discernable economic value from the minority to 
the controller (both cases are commonly referred to as self-dealing).38 For 
instance, minority shareholders and a controller might dispute whether 
the price offered to minority shareholders by the controller in a so-called 
“freezeout” merger was fair;39 or they might dispute whether an asset sold 
to, or acquired from, the corporation by the controlling owner was priced 
fairly.40 
 
 37. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 578, 584 (describ-
ing how sole-owner entrepreneurs retain cash-flow rights in the form of rights to all income 
from the business). 
 38. See id. at 571, 605–10 (describing self-dealing transactions and other behavior that 
can result in disproportionate reallocation of value to the controller). 
 39. See Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 Yale L.J. 2, 5 n.1 (2005) (“A 
freezeout is a transaction in which a controlling shareholder buys out the minority share-
holders in a publicly traded corporation . . . .”). 
 40. See, e.g., Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51 A.3d 1213, 1218 (Del. 2012) (dis-
cussing a challenge by minority shareholders to the company’s acquisition of its controller’s 
99.15% interest in another company on the grounds that the acquisition was at an inflated 
price); In re Straight Path Commc’ns Inc. Consol. Stockholder Litig., No. CV 2017-0486-SG, 
2018 WL 3120804, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 25, 2018) (discussing, in relevant part, an allegation 
by minority shareholders that the controlling shareholder had breached his fiduciary duties 
by selling some of the company’s intellectual property assets for six million dollars to settle 
an indemnification claim, when an existing consent decree had valued the assets at fifty 
million dollars). 
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In Delaware, the regime that governs self-dealing is the entire fairness 
standard.41 In practice, however, controlling shareholders engaging in self-
dealing have a choice: They can either submit the transaction to a judicial 
evaluation of its fairness or forgo such judicial review by voluntarily 
agreeing to a set of procedural conditions. Depending on the controller’s 
decision, Delaware courts will apply one of two alternative frameworks to 
cases of self-dealing involving cash flows:42 (1) entire fairness review, or (2) 
review under the business judgment rule when the self-dealing transaction 
was conditioned on receiving the approval of both the majority of the 
minority shareholders and a special independent committee (together 
known as the MFW conditions).43 Section I.A.1 discusses the first of these 
frameworks, while section I.A.2 discusses the second. 
1. Entire Fairness Review. — The Delaware courts normally apply the 
entire fairness standard to cases of self-dealing. Traditionally, under the 
entire fairness standard, a controlling shareholder bears the burden of 
proving the transaction’s fairness.44 Reviewing a transaction under “entire 
fairness” expressly requires scrutiny, not only of the process by which a 
transaction took place (“fair dealing”) but also of the price of the transac-
tion itself (“fair price”).45 Effectively, this means that in controlled 
companies, the controller is free to force a self-dealing transaction on the 
minority,46 so long as this transaction is subsequently subjected to an 
objective valuation of its fairness.47 
 
 41. See infra section I.A.1. 
 42. A third alternative in which the entire fairness review applies but with a shift in the 
burden of proof is also possible. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1117 
(Del. 1994) (“[A]n approval of the transaction by an independent committee of directors 
or an informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of proof on the issue of 
fairness from the controlling or dominating shareholder to the challenging shareholder-
plaintiff.”). This Article does not discuss this alternative because it does not add any insight 
to the analysis. 
 43. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014) (introducing the 
MFW conditions). 
 44. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing how 
transactions involving potential self-dealing concerns invoke the entire fairness standard). 
 45. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985) (“[T]he con-
cept of fairness has two aspects, fair dealing and fair price, both of which must be examined 
together in resolving the ultimate question of entire fairness.”). 
 46. For expositional convenience, this Article disregards the potential role of the 
board when its approval is required for self-dealing transactions. The extent to which 
boards—even without the judicial review—can be relied upon to resist powerful controllers 
is beyond the scope of this Article. For analysis of the challenges facing the oversight role of 
independent directors and potential reforms, see generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf 
Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1271 
(2017). 
 47. See Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory 
Meets Reality, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 393, 426 (2003) (“If challenged in court, the interested share-
holder must demonstrate both fair dealing and a fair price to satisfy the ‘entire fairness’ 
test.”). 
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Entire fairness review is fundamentally reliant upon the ability and 
competence of a third party—in this case, the Delaware courts—to per-
form an objective valuation of the disputed transaction. Given the need to 
determine fair price, Delaware courts faced with cash-flow disputes are 
routinely tasked with establishing the objective value of entire companies, 
business divisions, specific assets, and so on, in order to determine the 
appropriate payment owed to the dissenting minority shareholders.48 To 
do so, courts rely on valuation models, developed by economists for the 
pricing of assets,49 such as the Discounted Cash-Flow (“DCF”) model.50 
Applying valuation models is challenging for most courts, as it requires at 
least some understanding of financial theory. Despite nontrivial challenges 
to performing an objective valuation of the multifaceted assets and 
companies involved in conflicted transactions, Delaware courts, with their 
unique mastery of financial valuation techniques developed by econo-
mists, have been quite successful at applying the entire fairness review to 
cash-flow disputes in controlled companies.51 
To be sure, Delaware courts might disagree with the valuation meth-
ods offered by parties to the litigation or with the inputs that should be 
used in a specific case.52 Delaware courts also have occasionally rejected 
the valuation conclusions of parties to a litigation and instead conducted 
an independent valuation.53 Yet, despite these disagreements, courts do 
 
 48. See R. Scott Widen, Delaware Law, Financial Theory and Investment Banking 
Valuation Practice, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 579, 579 (2008) (“Delaware courts have developed a 
surprisingly large body of law regarding the proper analytics for valuing businesses. Most of 
this law has been developed in the context of adjudicating appraisal rights of dissenting 
shareholders in corporate M&A or going-private transactions.”). 
 49. See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 712–13. 
 50. Timothy A. Luehrman, What’s It Worth?: A General Manager’s Guide to Valuation, 
Harv. Bus. Rev. (May–June 1997), https://hbr.org/1997/05/whats-it-worth-a-general-managers-
guide-to-valuation [https://perma.cc/7Q3N-97BH] (recounting the development of the DCF 
model “as best practice for valuing corporate assets” and discussing the different ways compa-
nies use the model). 
 51. See, e.g., William A. Groll & David Leinwand, Judge and Banker—Valuation 
Analyses in the Delaware Courts, 116 Pa. St. L. Rev. 957, 959 (2012) (“[T]he Delaware courts 
have become quite sophisticated in reviewing valuation analyses and are thoroughly conver-
sant in the related, highly technical financial arcana.”); Widen, supra note 48, at 581 
(“Delaware courts have become increasingly sophisticated in their understanding of busi-
ness valuation techniques.”). 
 52. See, e.g., In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. CV 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, 
at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 
L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (“I conclude that the most reliable determinant of fair value 
of DFC’s shares is a blend of three imperfect techniques: a discounted cash flow model 
incorporating certain methodologies and assumptions each expert made and some of my 
own, the comparable company analysis respondent’s expert performed, and the transaction 
price.”). 
 53. See In re ISN Software Corp. Appraisal Litig., C.A. No. 8388-VCG, 2016 WL 
4275388, at *6 (Del. Ch. Aug. 11, 2016) (rejecting the valuations of the testifying experts 
and opting instead to adjust the inputs to the DCF model per the court’s judgment). 
952 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:941 
 
not devise their own methodologies for valuing cash-flow rights.54 As the 
next Parts argue, the fact that no financial technique can credibly value 
control rights undermines courts’ competence to adjudicate conflicts over 
the reallocation of these rights. 
2. Voluntary MFW Conditions. — Under Delaware law, controlling 
shareholders that wish to avoid costly litigation and the uncertainty associ-
ated with judicial “fairness” review can voluntarily condition the execution 
of a conflicted transaction upon receiving the support of both the majority 
of the minority and a negotiating “special committee” of independent and 
disinterested directors.55 When these conditions are met, Delaware courts 
do not apply entire fairness review. Instead, they will apply the highly def-
erential business judgment rule and avoid scrutiny of the transaction.56 In 
these cases, therefore, Delaware courts focus more on whether the minor-
ity shareholders were fully informed and uncoerced when voting upon the 
transaction than on the valuation methodologies that were used to estab-
lish the fairness of the price.57 Thus, the efficiency of the voluntary MFW 
conditions in cash-flow disputes is largely a product of the ability of minor-
ity shareholders and the “special committee” to competently value a trans-
action and avoid bargaining failure in cases where a transaction would 
create value. 
 
 54. For a discussion of the Delaware courts choosing between various valuation meth-
odologies developed by economists, see, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of 
Modern Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 38 (2003); Samuel C. 
Thompson, Jr., A Lawyer’s Guide to Modern Valuation Techniques in Mergers and 
Acquisitions, 21 J. Corp. L. 457, 463 (1996). 
 55. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014) (describing 
the requirements to clear a conflicted transaction without being held to the entire fairness 
standard). 
 56. See id. at 644 (“[B]usiness judgment is the standard of review that should govern 
[freezeouts] . . . where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the approval of an 
independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and 
the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”). Delaware courts 
have made clear that the deferential standard of review is only available in cases where the 
transaction is conditioned on the relevant approvals ab initio. See, e.g., In re Synutra Int’l, 
Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 2017-0032-JTL, 2018 WL 705702, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 2, 2018) 
(“The first prong of the [MFW] framework requires that ‘the merger is conditioned ab initio 
upon both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee . . . 
and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.’” (quoting 
M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644)). 
 57. See Itai Fiegenbaum, The Geography of MFW-Land, 41 Del. J. Corp. L. 763, 796–
97 (2017) (describing MFW’s “dual approval mechanism” as one “grounded in the efficacy 
of the positive endorsement by two qualified decisionmakers” and “believed to produce 
comparable benefits to intrusive judicial review in guaranteeing the best price possible for 
minority stockholders”). 
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B. Control Rights 
Unlike in the context of cash-flow rights, Delaware courts have been 
inconsistent in their resolution of conflicts over control rights.58 Control 
rights are, broadly stated, rights to decide on the business direction of a 
company, ranging from day-to-day operational to strategic management 
decisions.59 In controlled companies, control rights provide the control-
ling shareholder with the right to decide the company’s direction. Con-
flicts over control rights, like conflicts over cash-flow rights, arise either 
when a controller participates in a transaction where they stand on one 
side of the transaction and the controlled company stands on the other or 
when an action is taken by the corporation and it has the effect of reallo-
cating control rights either from the minority to the controller or vice 
versa. Importantly, this Article does not consider conflicts that arise at the 
initial allocation of control rights when the company goes public or when 
investors decide to provide capital but rather focuses on conflicts that arise 
from changes to an existing allocation of control rights—midstream 
changes.60 
Section I.B.1 discusses the earlier cases in which Delaware courts have 
applied the deferential business judgment rule, while section I.B.2 dis-
cusses the more recent cases in which Delaware courts have moved in the 
direction of applying the very demanding entire fairness review. Given the 
two diverging sets of case law, Delaware’s existing framework for determin-
ing whether reallocations of control rights deserve the scrutiny reserved 
for self-dealing is incoherent. 
1. Business Judgment Rule. — In applying the business judgment rule 
to midstream governance changes, Delaware courts must find that the 
challenged action taken by the corporation did not amount to “self-deal-
ing,” regardless of the disparate effect it might have on the controlling 
owner and the minority shareholders.61 To find this, the reviewing court 
must conclude that the controller did not receive something “to the exclu-
sion of, and detriment to, the minority.”62 Perhaps because of the appear-
ance of an equal pro rata legal effect in control rights conflicts, some courts 
have applied the business judgment rule even when charter amendments 
clearly resulted in the reallocation of control rights to the controlling 
 
 58. Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 564. 
 59. Id. at 565. 
 60. See generally Yu-Hsin Lin, Controlling Controlling-Minority Shareholders: 
Corporate Governance and Leveraged Corporate Control, 2017 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 453, 
458, 486–87 (defining the “midstream” stage as the “post-IPO” stage and describing the 
Google and Facebook recapitalizations as “midstream changes”). 
 61. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (holding that intrin-
sic fairness applies only when a controlling shareholder engages in self-dealing). Self-deal-
ing is when a parent company uses its dominion over a subsidiary to cause the subsidiary “to 
act in such a way that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, 
and detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary.” Id. 
 62. Id. 
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shareholder.63 Indeed, at times, Delaware courts have recognized that 
while the disparate economic effects of a corporate decision pose a practi-
cal conflict, such a conflict is legally irrelevant, and have thus applied the 
business judgment rule in their review. The discussion below summarizes, 
in chronological order, Delaware’s treatment of three of these midstream 
changes—namely, dual-class recapitalizations, tenure voting recapitaliza-
tions, and amendments relating to board representation. 
a. Dual-Class Recapitalization. — In a dual-class recapitalization, a pub-
lic company that has one class of shares switches to a dual-class structure.64 
The controlling shareholder is typically left holding the class of shares with 
superior voting rights and the public shareholders are left holding those 
shares with inferior voting rights.65 The dual-class recapitalization results 
in reallocation of control rights from minority shareholders to the control-
ling shareholder, because it allows the controllers to maintain control 
without holding the majority of the company’s cash-flow rights.66 
Delaware courts, however, did not review these evidently conflicted 
recapitalizations under the entire fairness standard. For instance, in Societé 
Holding Ray D’Albion S.A. v. Saunders Leasing System, Inc., a minority share-
holder of Saunders Leasing System, Inc., challenged a recapitalization 
plan that proposed to convert all existing stock into a class of stock with 
one vote per share (high-voting shares) and then issue a stock dividend to 
all holders of that class in the form of a share with one tenth of a vote per 
share (low-voting shares).67 Arguing that the plan was designed to achieve 
“the perpetuation of control” by the controller’s family—who would be 
able to retain majority voting power without the corresponding cash-flow 
rights holdings by selling the newly distributed low-voting shares—the 
plaintiff asked the court for a restraining order to prevent the plan.68 
Though the court acknowledged that the controllers had fiduciary duties 
 
 63. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 606 n.141 (discuss-
ing the difficulties of identifying self-dealing in control rights conflicts). 
 64. See Anand, supra note 3, at 193–95. 
 65. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem 
of Shareholder Choice, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1988). 
 66. Richard S. Ruback, Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 153, 153 
(1988). 
 67. No. 6648, 1981 WL 15094, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 1981). For a similar case, see 
Weiss v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., No. 8811, 1989 WL 80345, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1989). In 
Weiss, a class of Rockwell’s shareholders challenged a charter amendment that created a new 
class of ten-votes-per-share stock, which would be distributed pro rata as a dividend to exist-
ing shareholders. The court acknowledged that the amendment’s effect was to “cause dis-
proportionate voting power to become concentrated significantly in the hands of Rockwell’s 
long term stockholders.” Id. Moreover, because of an employee savings plan that included 
thirty percent of Rockwell’s outstanding stock, the directors were alleged to form part of 
those long-term shareholders who would benefit from the amendment. Id. Though the 
court acknowledged that one possible outcome of such a plan was to entrench the position 
of the controllers, it found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the amendment was 
not “a valid corporate act.” Id. at *3. 
 68. Saunders Leasing Sys., 1981 WL 15094, at *1. 
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to the minority shareholders, it ultimately found that the plan was “fair to 
minority stockholders,” in the colloquial sense of the term, and denied the 
plaintiff’s request.69 Such a fast, deferential ruling suggests that the court 
did not find the case to be one involving self-dealing. 
b. Tenure Voting Recapitalization. — Tenure voting is a regime in which 
shares held for a certain period of time are granted superior voting rights 
over those that have been held for a shorter length of time.70 In a tenure 
voting recapitalization, a company amends its charter midstream to pro-
vide for voting rights that change based on the length of time for which 
the share is held.71 Since public shareholders frequently trade their 
shares,72 and the controlling shareholder holds the control block for a 
long period of time,73 a tenure voting recapitalization, much like a dual-
class recapitalization, practically results in the controlling shareholder 
holding shares with higher voting power than the minority shareholders. 
In other words, a tenure voting recapitalization reallocates control rights 
to controlling shareholders by increasing the relative voting power of con-
trolling shareholders. 
In Williams v. Geier, minority shareholders challenged a controlled 
company’s tenure voting charter amendment after it had been recom-
mended by the board and approved by the controlling shareholders.74 The 
amendment granted all existing shares ten votes, but provided that once a 
share was sold, its voting rights would drop to one vote; the share would 
regain its ten votes only if held for a period of three years. Given the trad-
ing differences between public shareholders and controlling shareholders 
discussed above, by merely holding onto some of their existing shares, the 
 
 69. Id. at *3. To be clear, it must be emphasized that the determination that the plan 
was “fair” was not part of an entire fairness valuation, but rather a legal determination of 
the contractual effects of the plan. 
 70. See David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron J. Benjamin, Tenure Voting 
and the U.S. Public Company, 72 Bus. Law., Spring 2017, at 295, 297 (“Tenure voting re-
wards long-term investors with additional votes per share.”); Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. 
Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp. L. 541, 547 (2015) 
(describing “time-phased voting” arrangements as arrangements that “accord long-term 
shareholders more votes per share than they accord short-term shareholders”). 
 71. Berger et al., supra note 70, at 305 (“A company that recapitalizes its shares under 
a tenure-voting plan would give long-term shareholders more votes per share than short-
term shareholders.”). 
 72. Id. at 298. The average holding period of public-company stocks began to decline 
in the early 1980s, with the rise of the takeover boom. Id. (“By 1990, the period had fallen 
to about two years, and by the mid-2000s it was less than a year. By some accounts, the aver-
age holding period in 2015 for individual stocks across all U.S. markets was about seventeen 
weeks.”). 
 73. Dallas & Barry, supra note 70, at 548 (noting that “[b]ecause controlling share-
holders are generally long-term shareholders,” tenure voting “enhances their voting power 
relative to their percentage of share ownership . . . [and] allows the controlling sharehold-
ers to reduce their ownership in their firms while maintaining control”). 
 74. 671 A.2d 1368, 1370–71 (Del. 1996). 
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controllers could preserve control over the corporation without neces-
sarily holding a majority of the company’s cash-flow rights.75 Pointing to 
this consequence, the plaintiffs argued that the amendment be reviewed 
under the entire fairness standard. 
However, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judg-
ment rule applies to tenure voting recapitalizations. The majority opinion 
recognized the unique benefit that the amendment conferred on the con-
trollers—allowing them to sell some of their holdings without relinquish-
ing control—but concluded that the disparate economic impact of the 
changes did not amount to self-dealing.76 By contrast, the dissenting 
judges urged that the charter amendment should be subject to full judicial 
scrutiny under the entire fairness standard because it conferred “substan-
tial benefits on the majority shareholders.”77 The dissent noted that “the 
charter amendments worked fundamental changes in the governance” of 
the company by giving “the Geier Family shareholders control not only 
over the future composition of the Board, but over the strategic long-term 
planning of the company.”78 
c. Board Representation. — Charter amendments that affect the fre-
quency with which board members are up for election have also been 
reviewed under the business judgment rule, as in eBay Domestic Holdings, 
Inc. v. Newmark.79 Craigslist’s charter provided for a cumulative voting 
regime80 that was designed to give eBay, a minority shareholder, the ability 
to appoint one out of the three members of the board.81 The majority 
 
 75. See id. at 1378. 
 76. See id. (“[T]here was on this record . . . no non-pro-rata or disproportionate ben-
efit which accrued to the Family Group on the face of the Recapitalization, although the 
dynamics of how the Plan would work in practice had the effect of strengthening the Family 
Group’s control . . . .”); see also id. at 1382 (noting that in the case “entire fairness is not an 
issue”). 
 77. Id. at 1386 (Hartnett, J. & Horsey, J., dissenting). 
 78. See id. (“The proposed Plan significantly alters shareholder voting rights to the 
detriment of those minority shareholders who have no interest in preserving the family own-
ership, or whose investment objectives may have a different time frame from the Family 
Group.”). 
 79. See 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
 80. For a discussion of cumulative voting, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as 
Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124, 127 n.8 
(1994) (describing the typical cumulative voting regime in corporate settings). Classified 
boards work against cumulative voting by requiring increased voting power to elect a direc-
tor. Consider, for instance, a board of nine individuals elected using a cumulative voting 
regime and a minority shareholder M who owns forty shares, corresponding to forty percent 
of the voting power. If the nine board members are elected annually, then M only needs to 
allocate eleven percent of her voting power to elect a director. Edmund A. Stephan, 
Cumulative Voting and Classified Boards: Some Reflections on Wolfson v. Avery, 31 Notre 
Dame Law. 351, 354 n.5 (1956) (offering an example of this formula). However, if the board 
is classified, with only three directors up for election every year, then M will need to use 
twenty-six percent of her voting power to elect a director. Id. 
 81. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc., 16 A.3d at 13 (explaining that though eBay did not 
have a “contractual right” to fill the third board seat, “the laws of mathematics under a 
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shareholders, however, amended the charter to provide for a classified 
board, which created three classes of directors, with only one director fac-
ing an election each year.82 The classified board amendment rendered the 
cumulative voting regime impractical, in that it eliminated the possibility 
for eBay “to cumulate votes and direct those votes towards a single director 
candidate,” and thereby allowed the controllers to ensure that only their 
candidates would be elected to the board.83 eBay contended that entire 
fairness should apply because the classified board amendment benefited 
the controlling shareholders to the detriment of eBay.84 While the court in 
eBay recognized the conflict underlying the charter amendment,85 it 
refused to review the amendment under the entire fairness standard. 
Instead, the court held that the amendment’s disparate impact did not 
amount to self-dealing, and that eBay was not deprived of any right 
awarded to it under Delaware law.86 
2. Entire Fairness Review. — The decisions discussed above applied the 
business judgment rule to midstream reallocations of control rights. More 
recent Delaware decisions, however, seem to have implied that entire fair-
ness is the standard of review for midstream recapitalizations. The discus-
sion below provides a chronological overview of recent cases. 
a. Google. — As explained above,87 the plaintiffs in the Google litiga-
tion argued that Google’s move from a dual-class to a triple-class structure 
reallocated control rights from Class A to Class B shares.88 Thus, they 
alleged that the recapitalization constituted a form of self-dealing, subject 
to Delaware’s exacting entire fairness scrutiny.89 The defendants claimed 
 
cumulative voting system with a non-staggered board” ensured it would be able to elect one 
of the three directors). 
 82. Id. at 22. 
 83. Id. at 23. 
 84. See id. at 37. 
 85. See id. at 23 (“Practically speaking, however, the cumulative voting provisions are 
not meaningful if only one director position is up for election in any given year.”). 
 86. Id. at 38. The chancery court offered several reasons. First, it noted that “[the con-
trollers] did not realize a financial benefit by approving the Staggered Board Amendments 
so there was no self-dealing on the basis of financial considerations.” Id. Second, it explained 
that eBay was importantly not “deprived” of an entitlement because it was not “entitled” to 
Craigslist’s cumulative voting regime. Id. (“If a corporation implements a staggered board, 
and this renders the corporation’s cumulative voting system ineffective, minority stockhold-
ers have not been deprived of anything they are entitled to under the common law or the 
DGCL, because . . . [they] are not entitled to a cumulative voting system in the first 
instance.”). Lastly, the court admitted that the amendment had “disparate” impact on eBay, 
but concluded that it was “not the sort of disparate treatment, however, that can be classified 
as self-dealing because the law expressly allows majority stockholders to elect the entire 
board.” Id. 
 87. See supra notes 2–12 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Plaintiffs’ Opening Pretrial Brief at 1, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., 
No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728583. 
 89. Id. at 32 (“‘[D]efendants with a conflicting self-interest must demonstrate that the 
deal was entirely fair to other stockholders.’ The proposed Recapitalization unquestionably 
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the recapitalization was aimed at long-term value-maximization rather 
than entrenchment and, critically, that it was approved by independent 
and disinterested directors, entitling the decision to Delaware’s business 
judgment rule review.90 
Though the case ended in settlement, the corporate community was 
not left wholly in the dark regarding the court’s intuition. During the 
settlement hearing, then-Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr.91 suggested that the 
proposed recapitalization may have run afoul of expectations on the part of 
Class A shareholders that they might eventually, given enough time and 
dilution of Class B voting power, obtain a majority stake in Google.92 
Moreover, he referenced “tensions” in Delaware law as to the treatment of 
a conflicted vote by controlling shareholders, suggesting that Williams v. 
Geier might not squarely dictate business judgment review in the case of 
midstream recapitalizations.93 Still, Strine cautioned that “it would be 
hazardous for anyone to predict how [the trial] would have come out.”94 
Indeed, the notion that a recapitalization like the one proposed by Google 
might be subject to entire fairness was surprising, as such expectations of 
minority shareholders were never legally recognized. Moreover, the 
reallocation effect on minority shareholders of switching from dual-class 
to triple-class shares is less pronounced than the effect of switching from a 
one-share-one-vote to a dual-class structure or to a tenure voting regime, 
the latter of which received the business judgment rule protection.95 In 
 
provides personal benefits to Page and Brin, triggering the entire fairness review.” 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting In re S. Peru Copper Corp. Stockholder Derivative Litig., 30 
A.3d 60, 87 (Del. Ch. 2011))). 
 90. See Opening Pre-Trial Brief for Google Inc. and Independent Director Defendants 
at 25–31, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 
2013), 2013 WL 2728591 (“[T]he Recapitalization was approved by Google’s disinterested 
and independent Board for the purpose of providing the Company with the flexibility it 
needs to do stock-based acquisitions and issue stock-based compensation, while at the same 
time maintaining Google’s incredibly successful governance structure.”). 
 91. Strine was, until 2019, the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. 
 92. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *27, In re Google Inc. Class C 
S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“[R]ight 
now I have a certain percentage contractual expectancy if Google pays out dividends, and 
then I have a certain kind of noncontractual market-based assumption about how people 
look at the equity of the company . . . . You’ve now taken my same interest and just divided 
it in half.”). Strine also noted that “it’s never been the case that interested voting power gets 
a pass simply because it has voting power.” Id. at *38. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. (“[T]he stronger argument on behalf of the defendants is that they . . . believed 
that this was the right thing for Google’s public stockholders and that from the beginning, 
everyone has been clear . . . that these founders were going public but with no . . . intention 
to relinquish voting control . . . .”). 
 95. Perhaps with this in mind, some have agreed with Strine’s assessment that it was far 
from guaranteed that entire fairness would have been the correct standard to apply to the 
Google recapitalization. See Settlement Deletes Trial over Google Stock Split, Westlaw J. Del. 
Corp., June 24, 2013, at *1 (noting that Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh observed that 
the Google “plaintiffs’ characterization of the stock split was puzzling,” and stating, “If you 
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short, the Google case became the first in a series of recent cases that have 
cast doubt on the standard of review that applies to midstream 
recapitalizations. 
b. Facebook and IAC. — Following Google’s settlement, Facebook and 
IAC each proposed amending their respective charters to authorize the 
issuance of a new class of nonvoting stock, citing as their motivation the 
flexibility to raise and deploy significant capital without diluting the own-
ership stakes of the founders—Mark Zuckerberg of Facebook and Barry 
Diller of IAC.96 Stockholders of both Facebook and IAC sued to challenge 
the respective recapitalizations.97 Unlike Google, however, these lawsuits 
did not end in a settlement. Rather, both Facebook and IAC withdrew their 
recapitalization plans and avoided facing the costs and uncertainty of 
litigation.98 
c. Crane. — In IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, NRG Energy, Inc. 
(NRG) proposed a dual-class to triple-class recapitalization of NRG Yield, 
Inc. (Yield), a portfolio company in which NRG held a controlling stake.99 
However, unlike the Google, Facebook, or IAC cases, NRG conditioned 
the recapitalization from the outset on the approval of both (1) a majority 
of Yield shares not affiliated with NRG, and (2) a fully empowered, inde-
pendent special committee.100 In so doing, NRG attempted to shepherd 
 
have corporate control, there shouldn’t be anything suspect about approving an action that 
keeps control exactly where it’s been since the company’s inception”). 
 96. See supra note 13. 
 97. See Josh Beckerman, Calpers Sues Barry Diller over IAC/InterActive Stock Plan, 
Wall St. J. (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/calpers-sues-barry-diller-over-iac-
interactive-stock-plan-1481585007 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Dan Levine, 
Facebook Hit with Lawsuit over Plan to Issue New Stock, Reuters (Apr. 29, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-facebook-stocks-lawsuit-idUSKCN0XQ2LM 
[https://perma.cc/Z9CU-LREF]. 
 98. See Facebook, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680117000042/form8k_92217.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
BS4Z-9HTA]. The court, in approving a subsequent settlement, allowed the plaintiff to 
recover sixty-eight million dollars due to the success of blocking Facebook’s recapitalization. 
See In re Facebook, Inc. Class C Reclassification Litig., No. 12286-VCL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
1117, at *3–4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 24, 2018). Similarly, IAC’s Board of Directors “determined not 
to pursue the Company’s previously announced plan to create a new class of non-voting 
stock.” IAC/InterActiveCorp, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (June 21, 2017), https://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/891103/000110465917041328/a17-15693_18k.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/BZM3-226Y]. In announcing its intent to abandon its recapitalization plans, IAC 
specifically noted the pending litigation as a motivating factor: In light of “recent 
developments in the stockholder litigation that made it unlikely that the litigation would be 
finally resolved until late 2018 or 2019, . . . the considerable legal and related expenses of 
the litigation, and other relevant information, the Board determined not to proceed with 
the Class C Recapitalization.” Id. 
 99. No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017). In fact, Yield 
established two new classes of common stock, Classes C and D. Both granted one hundredth 
of a vote and would be distributed to Class A and B shareholders through a stock split. Id. 
at *1, *4. 
 100. See id. at *4. 
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the transaction through the voluntary MFW conditions in order to lower 
the standard of review from entire fairness to business judgment.101 Crane 
is noteworthy for two reasons. First, the transaction structure revealed that 
NRG considered the risk of entire fairness review sufficiently likely to war-
rant the time and expense of implementing the voluntary MFW condi-
tions. Second, and just as important, the chancery court did in fact choose 
to apply entire fairness review as a threshold matter, but then reduced the 
level of scrutiny to business judgment deference per MFW.102 As the court 
explained, entire fairness applied because the recapitalization afforded 
NRG “something uniquely valuable to the controller,” namely, “a 
means . . . to ensure it would be able to retain voting control of Yield well 
into the future without abandoning a key aspect of its original business 
model.”103 In other words, the court found that in a reallocation of control 
rights, notwithstanding the pro rata legal effect, the controller receives 
something “to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority.”104 
d. CBS. — On May 17, 2018, CBS, a dual-class corporation controlled 
by National Amusements, Inc. (NAI),105 decided to distribute a pro rata 
voting-shares stock dividend to all of its shareholders, including sharehold-
ers who previously held nonvoting shares.106 Given the company’s dual-
class structure, this move would have resulted in diluting the voting power 
of the controlling shareholder “from approximately 80% to 17%.”107 As 
motives for this action, CBS cited, among other things, the ability to 
“unlock significant stockholder value” and “more fully evaluate strategic 
alternatives.”108 For the purposes of this Article, CBS’s corporate action 
matters because the distribution would have reallocated control rights 
from the controlling shareholder to the minority. By distributing voting 
shares to the current owners of its nonvoting stock, CBS would effectively 
 
 101. See Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp. 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). 
 102. See Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9, *21. 
 103. Id. at *9 (quoting GAMCO Asset Mgmt. v. iHeartMedia Inc., No. 12312-VCS, 2016 
WL 6892802, at *16 (Del. Ch. Nov. 23, 2016)). 
 104. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720–22 (Del. 1971) (finding no self-
dealing through a pro rata distribution of dividends, but noting that “[i]f such a dividend 
is in essence self-dealing by the parent, then the intrinsic fairness standard is the proper 
standard”). 
 105. At the time, CBS reported that its controlling shareholder NAI owned approximately 
79.7% of the company’s Class A voting stock. See CBS Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 
13 (June 30, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/813828/000081382818000036/ 
cbs_10q-063018.htm [https://perma.cc/8Q2D-WJ5T] [hereinafter CBS Corp., June 2018 
Quarterly Report]. The Sumner M. Redstone National Amusements Trust in turn owns eighty 
percent of NAI’s voting interest and is itself controlled by the Redstone family. Id. 
 106. Press Release, CBS Corp., CBS Board of Directors Declares Dividend to Protect and 
Give Voting Power to Stockholders (May 17, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ 
data/813828/000089882218000033/ex99.htm [https://perma.cc/5HYT-7DQH] [hereinafter 
Press Release, CBS Corp.]. 
 107. CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, at *2 
(Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). 
 108. Press Release, CBS Corp., supra note 106. 
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accomplish the opposite of what Google, Facebook, and IAC wanted and 
eliminate the majority voting power of its controlling shareholder, NAI.109 
Unsurprisingly, NAI challenged the distribution in court.110 However, on 
September 9, 2018, the parties announced they had settled the dispute.111 
The above doctrinal review illustrates that while Delaware courts quite 
consistently apply the entire fairness review and voluntary MFW conditions 
to conflicts over cash-flow rights, they have been unable to achieve a simi-
larly coherent approach in the context of control rights conflicts. This 
asymmetry prompts the question: Why? As the next Part explains, conflicts 
over control rights have unique features that prevent the application of 
the tools that have worked well in cash-flow conflicts. 
II. THE COMPLEXITY OF ALLOCATING CONTROL RIGHTS 
Part I of this Article introduced the distinction between cash-flow 
rights and control rights and demonstrated that the Delaware courts have 
struggled to fashion a consistent approach to address conflicts over the 
reallocation of control rights. This Part argues that conflicts over the real-
location of control rights have two unique qualities that prevent their reg-
ulation like cash-flow rights conflicts. First, section II.A explains that the 
reallocation of control rights entails bargaining under conditions of a 
bilateral monopoly over an inevitably dichotomous choice between giving 
controllers a right to unilaterally reallocate control rights and giving 
minority shareholders a right to veto such reallocation. Second, section 
II.B shows that there are no acceptable methods, nor will there ever be, for 
valuing reallocation of control rights, as the value of control rights is both 
firm specific and individual specific. These realities make courts inherently 
incapable of adjudicating conflicts over the reallocation of control rights. 
A. The Dichotomous Choice over Reallocation of Control Rights 
To understand the dichotomous choice over the reallocations of con-
trol rights, one must first ask: Why do entrepreneurs and investors care 
about the allocation of control rights? 
Entrepreneurs value corporate control because it allows them to pur-
sue their idiosyncratic visions—the strategies that they genuinely believe 
would produce abnormal returns for the company, thereby benefiting all 
 
 109. See generally Matt Levine, Opinion, CBS Wants to Get Rid of a Shareholder, 
Bloomberg (May 15, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-05-15/cbs-
wants-to-get-rid-of-a-shareholder [https://perma.cc/RW9H-D6S7] (explaining the effect of 
CBS’s proposed dividend distribution). The pro rata distribution would have succeeded in 
diluting NAI’s voting power primarily because NAI only owned around 10.4% of CBS’s non-
voting interest. See CBS Corp., June 2018 Quarterly Report, supra note 105. 
 110. See CBS Corp., 2018 WL 2263385, at *2. In this case, it was CBS that filed the com-
plaint asking for a temporary restraining order to prevent NAI from interfering with the 
proposal by changing the composition of the board. Id. at *1–2. 
 111. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
962 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:941 
 
shareholders.112 An entrepreneur’s idiosyncratic vision reflects the parts of 
the entrepreneur’s business idea “that outsiders may be unable to observe 
or verify.”113 Given that business ideas take time to implement and require 
numerous decisions, ranging from day-to-day management issues to major 
strategic choices, investors might disagree with entrepreneurs about the 
company’s future direction—because of asymmetric information or differ-
ences of opinion—and prevent entrepreneurs from implementing their 
visions.114 Thus, control over corporate decisions enables entrepreneurs to 
pursue their visions even against investors’ objections. In other words, con-
trol matters for entrepreneurs mostly when investors might disagree with 
the entrepreneurs’ decisions about the company’s direction. Investors, by 
contrast, value control over corporate decisions because it offers protec-
tion against agency costs, like mismanagement and self-dealing.115 
In controlled companies, the parties allocate control rights and cash-
flow rights with the aim of balancing the controller’s need to pursue an 
idiosyncratic vision and minority shareholders’ need for protection against 
agency costs. Allocating more control rights to controllers gives them more 
freedom to pursue their idiosyncratic visions (if they are loyal and compe-
tent) and increases the risk of agency costs (if they are disloyal and incom-
petent); allocating more control rights to the minority has the opposite 
effect. 
At the initial contracting stage, such as the Initial Public Offering 
(IPO), the parties negotiate under competitive conditions: The investors 
can choose to invest elsewhere and the company may be considering mul-
tiple offers.116 Through the negotiation, the parties are able to reach an 
acceptable balance between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs that fits 
their preferences and the nature of the business activity. If future develop-
ments prompt a need to shift the balance the parties achieved in their 
initial allocation of control rights, the parties may reallocate control rights 
midstream. Any reallocation of control rights midstream will again raise 
the same tradeoff between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs that the 
parties faced initially. Importantly, however, while in the initial stage the 
parties negotiate the allocation of control rights under competitive condi-
 
 112. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 566. 
 113. See id. at 567, 579 (“This could be because sharing the information with outsiders 
would destroy its value (e.g., competitors could copy the idea) or simply because the entre-
preneur can present outsiders with nothing more than her strong conviction concerning 
the value of her idea.”). 
 114. See generally Eric Van den Steen, Disagreement and the Allocation of Control, 26 J.L. 
Econ. & Org. 385 (2010) (exploring “the allocation of control under open disagreement”). 
 115. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 581–82 (describing 
different forms of controllers’ agency costs). 
 116. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1820, 1825–29 
(1989) (discussing differences in the contracting process at the IPO stage and the mid-
stream stage). 
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tions, midstream changes take place when the parties are locked in a bilat-
eral monopoly.117 The parties, therefore, can only agree on who will have the 
right to decide the new balance of idiosyncratic vision and agency cost. 
Either controllers will receive the right to unilaterally reallocate control 
rights, or minority shareholders will have a veto right over such decisions. 
Sections II.A.1 and II.A.2 explore this tradeoff and discuss the conse-
quences of giving either party control rights. 
1. Controllers. — To understand the effect of granting either control-
lers or minority shareholders the right to determine midstream realloca-
tions of control rights, consider the Google example.118 Google justified 
the recapitalization on the basis that it would allow the controllers to con-
tinue to pursue their idiosyncratic visions while the company expands and 
issues equity.119 Over time, Google explained, circumstances or business 
strategy changed to an extent that required an adjustment to the original 
allocation of control rights. Indeed, Google’s very success and fast growth 
may be the kinds of changing circumstances that demand a reallocation 
of control rights. Should the company’s proposal thus be accepted? 
The reallocation of control rights is desirable only if the expected 
benefit—the future increase in company value—from preserving the con-
trollers’ ability to pursue their idiosyncratic visions exceeds the likely 
increase in agency costs that could arise from allowing the controllers to 
preserve control with a lower fraction of the company’s equity.120 In other 
words, if the parties choose to provide the controllers with the power to 
unilaterally reallocate control rights, the minority shareholders might ben-
efit from the controllers’ ability to keep pursuing idiosyncratic visions, but 
that benefit comes at the cost of exposing minority shareholders to an 
increased risk of agency costs. Clearly, it only makes sense to give the con-
trollers the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights if the benefit, as 
judged by the parties ex ante, exceeds the cost. 
Similarly, the agency costs that arise when the controller has the 
power to unilaterally reallocate control rights are no different from any 
other case of self-dealing: Even if a reallocation would not be in the best 
interest of the company, controllers might pursue the recapitalization 
anyway and reallocate control rights from the minority shareholders to 
themselves. In other words, controllers might be motivated by a desire to 
 
 117. See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
 119. See infra section II.B.1. 
 120. For helpful background on this view, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman & 
George Triantis, Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual-Class Equity: The Mechanisms 
and Agency Costs of Separating Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in Concentrated Corporate 
Ownership 295, 301–05 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); see also In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting 
Agreement Derivative Litig., No. 9962–VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *2 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) 
(“As control rights diverge from equity ownership, the controller has heightened incentives 
to engage in related-party transactions and cause the corporation to make other forms of 
non-pro rata transfers.”). 
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entrench themselves while getting more liquidity rather than by a genuine 
concern about their ability to pursue idiosyncratic visions. This is the 
essence of the agency-costs risk. 
2. Minority Shareholders. — Consider the alternative scenario: What if 
the minority shareholders are given the power to decide about the reallo-
cation of control rights? Recall that the reallocation is desirable if, and 
only if, the expected benefit from allowing the controller to pursue its 
idiosyncratic vision exceeds the likely increase in agency costs. Given this 
objective, empowering minority shareholders to veto a proposed recapital-
ization raises several issues.121 
First, there is a clear tension between the fundamental justification 
for giving controllers more control and the requirement that minority 
shareholders approve such reallocation of control rights. Leaving control 
with the company’s founders is valuable solely because it allows them to 
execute their idiosyncratic visions about the company’s future direction in 
the face of disagreement from other investors. By its nature, idiosyncratic 
vision is subjective and prone to differences of opinion between the con-
troller and the minority shareholders, so persuading minority sharehold-
ers about the value of the founders’ idiosyncratic visions is challenging. 
Thus, “[t]he risk of investors disrupting the entrepreneur’s pursuit of her 
idiosyncratic vision exists even when the firm is publicly traded and inves-
tors are using stock prices as a proxy for the firm’s performance.”122 
As a result, requiring minority shareholders’ approval is inconsistent 
with the controller’s justification for reallocating control rights. Control-
lers offer no “payment” for the reallocation, but instead offer an unen-
forceable, nonquantifiable promise that leaving control in their hands 
would lead to better firm performance in the future.123 Minority share-
holders must decide whether they believe that the founder’s idiosyncratic 
vision is indeed so valuable as to justify the increased risk of agency costs. 
The fact that the value of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision, by its very 
definition, may not be fully appreciated by the minority shareholders 
means that value-increasing reallocations of control rights may be 
blocked.124 
 
 121. See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 
1057, 1084–86 (2019) (explaining the difficulties associated with having minority sharehold-
ers vote on the extension of dual-class structures with sunset arrangements that automati-
cally convert to single-class structures after a certain amount of time). 
 122. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 580. 
 123. Id. at 579. 
 124. The fact that the company is already public—that investors had the opportunity to 
evaluate the founder’s performance—does not mean that investors surely know whether the 
founder’s idiosyncratic vision is sufficiently valuable. See infra section II.B.2. 
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Second, as already mentioned, this bargaining would take place 
under conditions of a bilateral monopoly.125 That is, there is no readily avail-
able replacement to the controlling shareholder who is seeking extra 
power in order to influence the direction of the company; the minority 
shareholders cannot force out controllers and replace them with others. 
The inherently subjective nature of idiosyncratic vision combined with the 
dynamic of a bilateral monopoly increases the risk of a negotiation 
breakdown. 
To make concrete why the dynamic might lead to a negotiation break-
down, consider again the case of Google, but now assume that the pro-
posed recapitalization requires the support of the Class A shareholders. 
When negotiating with the controlling shareholder, these shareholders 
will consider the expected benefit (the impact on the company in terms 
of the controller’s idiosyncratic vision) and the expected costs (agency 
costs associated with the controller’s potential for abuse and the loss stem-
ming from the decreased probability of Class A shareholders gaining con-
trol over the company). Assume that the Class A shareholders voted “no” 
and that the controlling shareholders do genuinely believe that their idio-
syncratic visions could substantially increase the value of the company. 
What can the controllers do? They have limited options in such a scenario: 
They can give up on the idiosyncratic vision by stopping the company from 
raising capital for expanding, allow the company to expand and risk losing 
their ability to implement their vision, or, if they can raise the resources, 
resort to alternative transactions such as a freezeout.126 
Taken together, these concerns suggest that while empowering minor-
ity shareholders will protect them from the risk of agency costs, it will also 
increase the risk of frustrating the controller’s pursuit of idiosyncratic 
vision.127 Therefore, the parties must choose between two imperfect 
regimes: Allow the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights, 
thereby protecting the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision while risking high 
exposure to agency costs; or provide minority shareholders with a veto 
right, thereby protecting against agency costs, but potentially sacrificing 
idiosyncratic vision. This tradeoff is inherent in the allocation of control 
rights, and it requires the parties to estimate which risk is more costly—
 
 125. The term “bilateral monopoly” refers to a situation “in which two parties must deal 
with each other.” John Cirace, A Synthesis of Law and Economics, 44 Sw. L.J. 1139, 1149 
(1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law & Economics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 293, 
298 (1992) (“[T]he relationship between a husband and a wife, or between the two parties 
to an already executed contract, is a bilateral monopoly.”). 
 126. This predicament ex post explains why controllers may be unwilling, ex ante, to 
give minority shareholders veto power over the reallocation of control rights. 
 127. This Article does not claim that minority shareholders will always reject the con-
troller’s proposal. See, e.g., Anand, supra note 3, at 208–10 (describing a case in Canada in 
which minority shareholders voted to allow the controller of Fairfax, a dual-class company, 
to get more control rights subject to certain limitations). Rather, it argues that there is no 
assurance that such a vote would lead to value-enhancing reallocations. 
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exposure to agency costs or loss of idiosyncratic vision.128 Given that the 
answer to this question is firm specific and individual specific, the parties 
will have to make their choice ex ante based on their relative bargaining 
position and accept whatever ex post consequences result from that 
choice. 
B. The Impossibility of Valuing Control Rights 
Section II.A has shown that the parties face an inevitable tension 
between agency costs and idiosyncratic vision. This analysis raises the ques-
tion: Can a third-party mechanism, such as judicial review, assist the parties 
in reaching a better midstream allocation of control rights? This Article 
argues that due to the impossibility of developing methods for valuing con-
trol rights, judicial review will be ineffective. Section II.B.1 demonstrates 
that there is no acceptable economic method for valuing control rights, 
and that economists are unlikely to develop such a method because these 
rights are both firm specific and individual specific. Section II.B.2 explains 
the difference between valuation and valuation models, and in so doing, 
shows why average market premiums or the market’s reaction to a pro-
posed reallocation of control rights cannot serve as substitutes for 
valuation models. 
1. Lack of Methodology to Value Control Rights. — Financial economics 
does not provide a methodology for valuing different allocations of con-
trol rights over a corporation. We are aware of no method—least of all one 
commonly accepted within the financial community—for determining the 
objective value of granting control over corporation A to individual B (as 
opposed to individual C).129 The lack of acceptable methods for valuing 
different allocations of control rights is not a matter of sheer coincidence. 
Rather, this Article contends that financial economists cannot devise a 
workable methodology for valuing allocations of control rights because the 
value of such allocations depends on firm-specific and individual-specific 
attributes. 
A key feature of common methodologies for valuing cash-flow rights 
is their ability to value assets independently of the individuals that control 
these assets. The methods for valuing companies, for example, abstract 
away from the person or entity that controls or manages these companies. 
A firm’s future cash flows are capable of derivation from readily available 
objective values,130 such as a firm’s exposure to systematic risk, debt-to-
 
 128. Moreover, entrepreneurs and investors might attach different values to these risks. 
See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 586 (“[A]gency costs and 
idiosyncratic vision are not necessarily valued symmetrically. Thus, the entrepreneur might 
proportionally value control rights much more than the increase in price that the investors 
will demand due to their increased exposure to agency costs.”). 
 129. See supra note 27. 
 130. See, e.g., Jay W. Eisenhofer & John L. Reed, Valuation Litigation, 22 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 37, 112–13 (1997) (describing DCF methodology and its use in calculating cash flows); 
see also Tim Koller, Marc Goedhart & David Wessels, McKinsey & Co., Valuation: Measuring 
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equity ratios, expected revenue, and other financial metrics, which are not 
inherently tied to particular officers of the firm. This abstraction from 
individual-specific and firm-specific factors is critical for turning these 
methodologies into objective measures of value that can be generalized 
and applied across different companies.131 
However, the abstraction that is so critical for modeling cash-flow 
rights’ valuation cannot work in the context of control rights. The goal of 
valuing the reallocation of control rights is to determine the value of a 
specific company under the control of a specific individual. The decision at 
issue in conflicts over reallocation of control rights is not between con-
trolled ownership and dispersed ownership, but rather between giving 
more, or less, control rights to Controller A, as opposed to Controller B. 
Consequently, any methodology for valuing allocations of control rights 
would have to determine the value of a specific entrepreneur’s idiosyn-
cratic vision for a specific company, and the potential loss from agency 
costs associated with granting more control to that individual, who might 
abuse that control. 
To demonstrate the central point here, consider the valuation chal-
lenges associated with the Google and Facebook recapitalizations. Recall 
that these recapitalizations reallocated control rights by making it easier 
for the founders to preserve their voting majority while the companies 
continued to raise equity capital. In both cases, the companies’ principal 
justification for the recapitalization focused not on the price that the 
founders paid for the reallocation of control rights but on the benefit that 
the new control structure allegedly would produce for the company and 
its investors. Google argued that the recapitalization would allow its found-
ers to continue steering the company without “becoming vulnerable to 
short-term pressures,”132 and Facebook emphasized the vision of the com-
pany’s founder and the need to maintain a “long-term” focus.133 Operating 
in the background for these companies was an additional concern that the 
 
and Managing the Value of Companies 103–31 (5th ed. 2010) (describing “the most com-
mon DCF valuation models, with particular focus on the enterprise DCF model and the 
economic-profit model,” and detailing the calculation inputs and processes). 
 131. Some methodologies require firm-specific inputs: The DCF method for valuing 
companies, for example, often relies on management projections about the company’s 
future revenues, and these projections might reflect the past performance of those in con-
trol of the corporation. Yet, these methodologies do not purport to measure the likely con-
tribution of specific individuals to company value. 
 132. Opening Pretrial Brief of Defendants Larry Page and Sergey Brin at 4–10, In re 
Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 
2728581 (“By holding their shares longer than other pre-IPO holders, the Founders now 
have the ability, if they vote together, to elect directors who support Google’s long-term focus 
and unique mission.”). 
 133. See Facebook, May 2016 Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 61 (“The Special 
Committee and our board of directors believe that a significant portion of the success real-
ized by us has been attributable to Mr. Zuckerberg’s leadership, creative vision, and man-
agement abilities . . . . Mr. Zuckerberg’s continued leadership role in our company will 
provide substantial benefits to us and to our stockholders.”). 
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risk of losing control would discourage their controllers from funding 
growth by raising capital or making acquisitions. Taken together, both 
companies claimed that the recapitalizations would increase their value.134 
Given these justifications, the valuation would have to determine the 
recapitalizations’ effect on the corporation—that is, the effect that facili-
tating the founders’ control over Facebook and Google would have on 
company value. As explained above, incontestable control allows a 
founder to pursue an idiosyncratic vision for the company even against 
investors’ objections.135 At the same time, incontestable control increases 
the risk of agency costs—the risk that controllers will use their dominant 
positions to advance their own interests at the expense of the company or 
its minority shareholders. Thus, any method for valuing control rights will 
have to objectively evaluate individual-specific traits that are difficult to 
observe—the controller’s idiosyncratic vision, competence to execute it, 
and loyalty—within a firm-specific context. 
The valuation of an idiosyncratic vision is on its own particularly diffi-
cult, as idiosyncratic vision is, by its very nature, a subjective view for 
improvement of the firm that may run counter to market consensus. This 
inquiry is forward looking and inherently individual specific. For instance, 
the goal of the inquiry would be to determine the value of having Mark 
Zuckerberg’s idiosyncratic vision, and not that of any other entrepreneur, 
implemented at a specific company, Facebook (and not any other company). 
Any model would therefore need to grapple with a particular individual’s 
contribution to a particular firm. 
The valuation of agency costs also poses challenges. The methodology 
would have to assign a value to the effect that increased control has on 
Zuckerberg’s agency costs—his likelihood of abusing control to expropriate 
investors—and the likely impact of these agency costs on Facebook’s value.136 
And there is yet another type of agency cost to evaluate: Recall that one of 
the concerns underlying the recapitalizations is that, unless companies 
make it easier for founders to preserve their control, the companies might 
not raise more equity capital, thereby missing out on opportunities for 
growth.137 A valuation would therefore have to assess both the value of 
these growth opportunities and whether the recapitalization is necessary 
 
 134. See supra notes 132–133. Note that in Facebook’s case, the company also claimed 
that Zuckerberg agreed to new restrictions on his control shares. This Article does not 
address that point. See Facebook, May 2016 Proxy Statement, supra note 13, at 61–62. 
 135. Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 590. 
 136. The Google plaintiffs’ pretrial brief seems to have recognized the difficulties of this 
valuation. See Plaintiffs’ Opening Pretrial Brief at 55, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder 
Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. filed June 10, 2013), 2013 WL 2728583. Specifically, the plain-
tiffs argued that a controller “cannot take advantage of a run of success[,] even a long run 
of success, to change a company’s corporate governance to give him permanent voting con-
trol,” lest courts “be stuck with the invidious task of deciding how much ‘success’ was enough 
to justify entrenching management.” Id. 
 137. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. 
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for the company to pursue them. The extent to which controllers will 
abuse their control, with or without the recapitalization, depends on a 
myriad of specific characteristics, including the controllers’ identity and 
personality, their liquidity position, the company’s industry, and so on. 
Further, and even more difficult for accurate valuation, the model 
would need to make forward-looking predictions. After all, Zuckerberg 
may well be able to successfully execute his idiosyncratic vision today. How-
ever, a reallocation of control rights will have implications for Facebook 
down the line, so any valuation model will have to consider Zuckerberg’s 
loyalty and competence then as well as now. It is hard enough to evaluate 
human behavior and determine an individual’s values and incentives on 
the basis of today’s knowledge; it is even harder to predict human behavior 
in the future. 
Valuation techniques are simply not equipped to consider all of these 
individual-specific and firm-specific factors that are crucial for valuing con-
trol rights and yet very difficult to observe. Once one abstracts away from 
the firm-specific and individual-specific features, there is no meaningful 
metric left. In other words, the goal of valuing the reallocation of control 
rights is to assign value to the expected idiosyncratic vision and expected 
agency costs of a specific individual in the context of a specific company. 
Abstracting away from individual-specific and firm-specific features—the 
basic aspect that typically enables economists to perform valuation of cash-
flow rights—would contradict the precise goal of the valuation and render 
it meaningless in the context of reallocation of control rights. Thus, there 
is not, nor can there ever be, an economic methodology for determining 
firm value under different allocations of control rights. 
2. Valuations and Valuation Models. — Section II.B.1 argues that it is 
inherently impossible to create valuation models for the reallocation of 
control rights. This claim, however, does not imply that control rights do 
not have value or that investors or other market actors do not value them. 
Indeed, investors routinely engage in valuing control rights because these 
rights affect idiosyncratic vision and agency costs, and hence firm value.138 
But the fact that investors value control rights does not mean that there is 
an objective valuation method that a competent court could use while 
adjudicating a conflict over the reallocation of control rights. To see why, 
this Article focuses on two methods by which control might be valued. 
Section II.B.2.a discusses empirical studies that measure the average 
premium paid for control across other firms. Section II.B.2.b discusses the 
market’s reaction to a specific company’s reallocation of control. 
a. Empirical Average Values of Control. — Empirical studies of control 
measure, using different methods, the value that the market has assigned 
 
 138. John D. Finnerty & Douglas R. Emery, The Value of Corporate Control and the 
Comparable Company Method of Valuation, 33 Fin. Mgmt. 91, 97 (2004) (describing dif-
ferent valuation methods that include the valuation of control rights because “[c]orporate 
control accounts for a significant portion of a firm’s value”). 
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to control rights.139 In particular, studies have calculated the average pre-
mium paid in complete acquisitions of a firm in different industries,140 the 
average premium paid for a control block in different countries,141 and the 
average premium for the superior shares of dual-class firms in different 
countries.142 
As an illustration, assume that a firm is auctioned for sale.143 To deter-
mine what purchase price to offer, each potential bidder will estimate the 
improvements that can be made to the firm (such as reducing the cost of 
capital, cutting operational costs, or improving sales), the synergies that 
can be attained with the bidder’s own business (such as costs savings due 
to economies of scale or scope), and any idiosyncratic vision the bidder 
might have. While it is possible to objectively estimate the potential 
improvements144 and synergies,145 it is impossible to estimate the bidder’s 
idiosyncratic vision, for the reasons discussed above. Nevertheless, each 
bidder assesses the value of their idiosyncratic vision and reflects any such 
value in their bid for the company. If there is more than one bid, the aver-
age control premium offered for the firm can be calculated. Similarly, with 
a sample of several acquisitions, one can calculate the average control pre-
mium in an industry.146 
Likewise, the average premium paid for control blocks reflects the fact 
that when a controlling shareholder is selling its control block, potential 
bidders will offer a premium for the same reasons as above, but may addi-
tionally do so for one other reason: Some bidders might include the 
 
 139. See, e.g., Avner Kalay, Oğuzhan Karakaş & Shagun Pant, The Market Value of 
Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from Option Prices, 69 J. Fin. 1235, 1236 (2014) 
(using option prices to estimate the market value of the shareholder voting rights associated 
with a stock). 
 140. See generally, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley & Jeffry M. Netter, The 
Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 49 
(1988). 
 141. See generally, e.g., Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits 
from Control of Public Corporations, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 371 (1989); Alexander Dyck & Luigi 
Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. Fin. 537 (2004). 
 142. See generally, e.g., Kristian Rydqvist, Takeover Bids and the Relative Prices of 
Shares that Differ in Their Voting Rights, 20 J. Banking & Fin. 1407 (1996); Luigi Zingales, 
What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q.J. Econ. 1047 (1995). 
 143. This Article assumes that incumbent management would leave the business. Thus, 
whatever idiosyncratic vision they have is no longer relevant. 
 144. See generally Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Control: Implications for Control 
Premiums, Minority Discounts and Voting Share Differentials, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 487 
(2012) (proposing a methodology to measure such premiums). 
 145. See generally Aswath Damodaran, The Value of Synergy (Oct. 30, 2005) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=841486 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(considering the various sources of synergy and categorizing them into operating and 
financial synergies). 
 146. See, e.g., George Alexandridis, Kathleen P. Fuller, Lars Terhaar & Nickolaos G. 
Travlos, Deal Size, Acquisition Premia and Shareholder Gains, 20 J. Corp. Fin. 1, 2 (2013) 
(offering a study of control premiums in a sample consisting of acquisitions of 3,691 U.S. 
firms). 
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private benefits of control they intend to gain from expropriating the 
minority in their offered bid price.147 Again, if there is more than one bid-
der, an average premium can be calculated, and given different transac-
tions in control blocks, an average premium in a specific country can be 
calculated.148 
Lastly, empirical studies also calculate the premium at which the 
superior-voting-class shares trade when a corporation has tradable dual-
class shares.149 This premium reflects investors’ estimates of the potential 
control premium they might receive or the potential cost they might suffer 
because of agency costs. 
Despite the existence of empirical studies measuring the value of pre-
miums paid in each of the above cases, to date, no empirical study has 
offered an objective method to evaluate control by a specific individual of 
a specific company. The fact that investors value control and buyers of con-
trol are willing to pay a control premium does not imply that there is an 
acceptable method for valuing different allocations of control rights over 
a specific company. 
More specifically, the fact that empirical studies can calculate the 
average value of control in some markets cannot serve as a substitute for a 
methodology that measures the effect of providing a specific individual 
with more control over a specific company. In a midstream reallocation of 
control rights, the value of the firm will increase if a competent and loyal 
controller will succeed in attaining idiosyncratic vision. But the value 
might decrease if incompetent and disloyal controllers simply pursue 
agency costs, or loyal and competent controllers are simply wrong about 
the value of idiosyncratic vision or about their ability to attain it. 
Relying upon a calculation of the average premium paid for control 
provides no help in this situation because by its very definition, the average 
value of control in a given market will reflect every breed of controller—
the competent and incompetent, the successful and unsuccessful, as well 
as the loyal and disloyal. Yet in a midstream reallocation of control rights, 
the specific controller is arguing that they are loyal and that implementing 
 
 147. U.S. law allows controllers to sell their shares for a premium. See John C. Coffee, 
Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware Law Encourage Efficient 
Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 Del. J. Corp. L. 359, 360 (1996); Ronald 
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785, 
787 (2003) (describing the types of private benefits that can be derived from control and 
the possible limits on extracting these benefits). 
 148. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 149. Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evidence, 12 
Rev. Fin. 51, 77–79 (2008) (reviewing the empirical studies on differences in market value 
between high-vote and low-vote shares); Steven R. Cox & Dianne M. Roden, The Source of 
Value of Voting Rights and Related Dividend Promises, 8 J. Corp. Fin. 337, 337–40 (2002) 
(analyzing the relationship between different classes of stock and their corresponding 
prices); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-
Country Analysis, 68 J. Fin. Econ. 325, 344–45 (2003) (studying the difference in price 
between high-vote and low-vote shares in eighteen countries). 
972 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 120:941 
 
their idiosyncratic vision would produce above-market returns. That is, they 
are arguing they are above the average. Thus, an average, as such, cannot 
help a court when adjudicating such claims.150 
b. Market Reaction to Reallocations of Control Rights. — In a publicly 
traded company, any reallocation—or expected reallocation—of control 
rights will be priced by the market. Indeed, when Google announced its 
recapitalization, the market price of its publicly traded Class A shares 
dropped, suggesting that the market viewed the specific decision to reallo-
cate control rights to Brin and Page as unfavorable to Class A shares.151 In 
the face of that market reaction, it is tempting to argue that changes in 
companies’ stock prices should serve as an objective measure on which 
courts could rely to determine the value of the reallocated control rights. 
While the controller’s claim that they do have idiosyncratic vision can be 
challenged on the grounds of bias, the market reaction is arguably unbi-
ased; after all, investors were willing to accept a lower price for their shares 
and exited. 
However, the market reaction to the announcement about expected 
reallocation of control rights cannot serve as an “objective” valuation 
methodology.152 This follows from the fact that underlying the concept of 
idiosyncratic vision is a fundamental disagreement with the market. This 
disagreement is not necessarily about conflict (whether the controller is dis-
loyal and thus lying about the need to get more control rights to pursue 
idiosyncratic vision), but can also be about competence (whether controllers 
are right about the value of their idiosyncratic vision and their ability to 
attain it). Despite the market’s disagreement, (loyal) controllers seek to 
retain control in order to execute their idiosyncratic visions because they 
believe their idiosyncratic visions will increase the value of the company. 
But by its very nature, idiosyncratic vision may not be accurately priced by 
the market. Indeed, as explained earlier,153 this concern is an important 
reason for controllers’ unwillingness to provide the market—minority 
shareholders—with the power to veto reallocation of control rights. To 
subject the reallocation of control rights to a valuation based on the mar-
ket’s reaction to a proposed recapitalization would be to restate the fact 
that the shareholders and the controller do not share the same opinion of 
the controller’s vision. Using market prices as the methodology for valuing 
 
 150. The average could be useful in other contexts in which the idiosyncratic vision of 
the manager is not at play. For instance, when claiming a negligent sale process of a firm 
(Revlon breach), the average premium that could be attained in the industry could serve a 
useful measure for damages. 
 151. See Jeremy C. Owens, Google Shares Drop on Stock-Split News, Mercury News 
(Apr. 13, 2012), https://www.mercurynews.com/2012/04/13/google-shares-drop-on-stock-
split-news-2 [https://perma.cc/5A8J-BP42]; infra note 154. 
 152. Others have explained, in other contexts, why market prices should not be used 
for valuation purposes. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” 
Appraisal Rule, 34 J.L. Econ. & Org. 543, 546 (2018). 
 153. See supra section II.A.2. 
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reallocations of control rights would therefore be inconsistent with the 
fundamental justification for allocating control rights to founders. In fact, 
using the market reaction would be tantamount to courts routinely accept-
ing the valuation claim of one side to the litigation. 
Moreover, according to the controller, shareholders that sold their 
shares did so based on a misguided understanding of the controller’s idi-
osyncratic vision. To illustrate this point, first note that from the announce-
ment of the recapitalization on April 12, 2012 to April 13, 2012 the Google 
share price dropped roughly 4.1% while the Nasdaq composite dropped 
only about 1.4%, suggesting a “damage” of 2.7% to the value of Google.154 
However, fast-forwarding five years, the shareholders who held, or bought, 
the shares seem to have won out: While the Nasdaq composite rose 
119.24%, Google shares rose 213.97%, beating the index by 94.73%.155 
These facts are malleable and can be used by both parties in litigation 
regarding a midstream reallocation of control rights. While the controllers 
will argue that without the recapitalization Google would not have beaten 
the market, the opposing minority shareholders will argue that Google 
would have outperformed the market by an even greater percentage of 
97.43% (94.73% + 2.7%), had they not reallocated control rights.156 
Accordingly, although the selling shareholders choose to exit, their view 
about the value of the reallocation of control rights cannot be determina-
tive because they might be wrong. The possibility of error is especially 
troubling in litigation that takes place immediately following the an-
nouncement of a recapitalization, before the effect of the recapitalization 
has materialized.157 Thus, while controllers might sometimes overestimate 
the value of their idiosyncratic vision, market reaction to reallocation of 
control rights might also be wrong, and in any case, it is far from objective. 
Finally, market reaction reflects investors’ assessment of the likely im-
pact of the new allocation of control not only on company value, but also 
 
 154. Alphabet Inc. (GOOG): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https://finance.yahoo.com/ 
quote/GOOG/history?p=GOOG [https://perma.cc/5DCG-62QH] (start: Apr. 12, 2012; end: 
Apr. 13, 2012); NASDAQ Composite (^IXIC): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https://finance. 
yahoo.com/quote/%5EIXIC/history?p=%5EIXIC [https://perma.cc/C2Q3-HLYH] (start: 
Apr. 12, 2012; end: Apr. 13, 2012). 
 155. Alphabet Inc. (GOOG): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https://finance.yahoo.com/ 
quote/GOOG/history?p=GOOG [https://perma.cc/WTQ7-DKUE] (start: Apr. 12, 2012; 
end: Apr. 12, 2017); NASDAQ Composite (^IXIC): Historical Data, Yahoo Fin., https:// 
finance.yahoo.com/quote/%5EIXIC/history?p=%5EIXIC [https://perma.cc/3RDA-HWTV] 
(start: Apr. 12, 2012; end: Apr. 12, 2017). 
 156. Practically, it is hard to believe that the selling shareholders estimated that Google 
would beat the market by 97.43%, and thus sold because 2.7% would be deducted from their 
expected return after the recapitalization. Where could they realistically invest their money 
instead and beat the market by more than 94%?! 
 157. Longer-term assessment of the value of such recapitalizations at other companies, 
in order to identify their average effect on firm value, for example, would not serve as a 
substitute for a valuation model. As explained above, judicial review in this context requires 
an objective method for determining the value of a specific controller for a specific 
company. See supra section I.A.1. 
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on minority investors’ expectation of gaining a portion of the control pre-
mium. To illustrate these two components of market reaction, consider 
again the case of Google. When the recapitalization was announced, 
Google’s share price dropped, reflecting at least some investors’ valuation 
that reallocation of control rights to Brin and Page would not maximize 
value for Google’s Class A shareholders. However, it is not at all clear why 
the price dropped. Some shareholders did not trade, while some sold and 
others bought. Were the shareholders who sold for a lower price willing to 
do so because they feared higher agency costs? Or did the price drop to 
reflect the lower likelihood that the market could eventually gain control 
and attain the accompanying premium? For a method that will measure 
the effect of different allocations of control rights on the value of Google, 
a price drop because of fears of increased agency costs is relevant, but a 
drop reflecting the loss of control expectations is not. After all, corporate 
law recognizes the controllers’ entitlement to avoid actions that will lead 
to their loss of control.158 
Ultimately, as is explained in more detail below, the lack of an 
acceptable methodology for valuing control rights means that judicial 
review cannot assist controllers and minority shareholders in making 
better decisions, ex post, about the reallocation of control rights. 
III. RESOLVING CONTROL CONFLICTS 
The unique features of the reallocation of control rights—a dichoto-
mous choice made in a setting in which a bilateral monopoly is present 
and acceptable methods for valuation are absent—has implications for the 
role of corporate law in resolving disputes over the allocation of these 
rights. This Part argues that the only appropriate response by courts when 
addressing reallocations of control rights in controlled companies is to 
treat the issue as a question of charter interpretation as to who has the 
decisionmaking power, rather than as a question of self-dealing. 
This Part begins by considering the application of Delaware’s entire 
fairness standard—the regime that applies to self-dealing—to realloca-
tions of control rights. Section III.A uses the example of the dual-to-triple-
class recapitalization to show that the entire fairness standard, in any form, 
should not apply to conflicts over reallocation of control rights. The sec-
tion then argues that any intermediate form of judicial review is also 
unlikely to be desirable. Section III.B explains that Delaware courts should 
regulate reallocations of control rights by deferring to the arrangement 
settled upon in the charter. Where the charter does not offer an answer, 
Delaware courts should apply the business judgment rule to midstream 
reallocations of control rights. 
 
 158. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 602 (“As courts in 
Delaware have long recognized, controllers cannot be forced to sell their control blocks 
even when doing so would clearly benefit the corporation or its minority shareholders.”). 
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A. The Limits of Judicial Review 
This section argues that Delaware courts’ approach for adjudicating 
conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders is dependent on 
the financial community to develop valuation methodologies. Since no 
methodologies exist for valuing reallocation of control rights, Delaware’s 
existing approaches—the entire fairness review,159 voluntary MFW condi-
tions,160 and intermediate scrutiny161—should not apply to the reallocation 
of control rights. 
1. Entire Fairness Review. — As explained above,162 Delaware’s regime 
governing self-dealing—entire fairness review—critically relies on courts’ 
competence to value cash-flow rights and determine their “fair price.”163 
Under the entire fairness standard, controlling shareholders can engage 
in self-dealing transactions without securing the approval of independent 
directors or minority shareholders, as long as the transaction is subject to 
a judicial determination of its fairness.164 Judicial review of a transaction’s 
fairness has worked well in the context of cash-flow rights conflicts, as eco-
nomic theory has long developed methodologies—on which Delaware 
courts rely—for valuing companies and other assets. 
Subjecting midstream reallocations of control rights to entire fairness 
review would require the court to assess the fairness of the new allocation 
of control rights. However, as section II.B explains, there are no acceptable 
methods on which courts can rely for valuing control rights. Moreover, 
attempting to develop such methods is an inherently futile task because of 
the subjective nature of control rights. Without valuation models to guide 
courts, entire fairness review would be quite speculative: Courts would 
have no reliable methodology for identifying value-enhancing realloca-
tions of control rights, and the outcome of judicial review would be 
unpredictable.165 
Parties will not wish to rely on speculative and unpredictable judicial 
review as it might fail to protect investors from agency costs, and it could 
deter controllers with idiosyncratic visions from attempting to reallocate 
 
 159. See infra section III.A.1. 
 160. See infra section III.A.2. 
 161. See infra section III.A.3. 
 162. See supra section I.A.1. 
 163. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (“The concept of fairness 
has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.”). 
 164. See In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 47–48 (Del. Ch. 2013) (holding 
that although “the interests of the preferred and common stockholders were not aligned,” 
the transaction was fair (quoting In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 1512–VCL, 
2009 WL 2225958, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009))). 
 165. Cf. Geeyoung Min, Governance by Business Decisions: Dividends and Shareholder 
Voting 33–37 (Aug. 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) (arguing that dividend distributions that reallocate control rights should be subject 
either to enhanced scrutiny or to entire fairness review). 
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control rights.166 Under the entire fairness standard, even controllers with 
extremely valuable idiosyncratic visions would be subject to costly litiga-
tion.167 The deterrence effect on the controllers with valuable idiosyncratic 
visions might be particularly acute given the likelihood that courts will 
tend to underestimate the value of their idiosyncratic vision. As courts 
know, all controllers have an incentive to claim that they have an extremely 
valuable idiosyncratic vision, but many of them will be objectively wrong 
about the value of their idiosyncratic visions and their ability to attain 
them, and some of them will simply be lying. These realities might bias 
courts against finding that the expected value of the controller’s idiosyn-
cratic vision exceeds the risk of agency costs. 
 
 166. To see why, assume there are 100 controlled firms in the market, each with a con-
troller who owns 15% of the equity. Of these 100, twenty-five will wish to reallocate control 
rights, and assume further that while in five of these firms the controllers have idiosyncratic 
vision (“A firms”), in twenty of them controllers would merely exploit private benefits of 
control (“B firms”). If one of the twenty B firms reallocates control rights, the controller 
will inflict damage due to agency costs, ranging from $2 to $30, with an average of $20. If 
one of the five A firms with the truly exceptional controllers reallocates control rights it will 
add $100 in firm value, out of which $15 will accrue to the controller because of their equity. 
To understand the deterrent effect of unpredictable valuations, assume a controller needs 
to first go through with an irreversible reallocation of control rights and thereafter, using 
an unpredictable valuation method, the court submits the bill, which requires the controller 
to pay damages if the allocation is found to be unfair. Given that twenty out of twenty-five 
firms will have agency costs, in each litigation, there is an 80% probability that the court will 
find the allocation to have been unfair. Thus, in 20% of the cases the court will believe that 
the controller has idiosyncratic vision and the bill will be zero, while in 80% of the cases the 
bill will be positive and will randomly range from $2 to $30, though still maintaining an 
average of $20. How would that affect the behavior of controllers? The worst controllers, 
those who inflict $30 in damage, will go through with the reallocation. The “worst” that can 
happen to them is that the court submits the correct bill of $30 and they break even. Any 
lower bill will represent a windfall and this windfall will arrive with a high probability (20% 
probability to keep the $30 and 80% probability to pay back $30 or less). Controllers with 
idiosyncratic vision will be deterred, even if they are not risk averse. If the court recognizes 
their idiosyncratic vision (20% probability), the bill will be zero and they can increase value 
and collect their share of the gain, $15. If the court is mistaken (80% probability), then they 
might receive a bill with an average value of $20. For the controller with idiosyncratic vision 
the expected value of the reallocation is negative ((20% x $15) – (80% x $20) = -$13). Once 
all the five A firms are deterred, and all the controllers within the twenty B firms that might 
consume less than $20 in private benefits are also deterred, the court will adjust the average 
upward until even the worst controllers are deterred. This “equilibrium” of entire fairness 
valuations will practically evolve into a flat prohibition of reallocation of control rights. The 
result will damage diversified shareholders and the market. The prohibition blocks twenty 
firms from inflicting a total damage of $400 at the price of losing the $500 increase in value 
of the five firms with idiosyncratic vision. 
The situation is not going to improve if, as it might be the case in reality, controllers 
can reverse course and cancel the reallocation after the court declines to find idiosyncratic 
vision and issues an injunction. See infra note 202. 
 167. See In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 534 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. 
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (“[A]bsent the ability . . . to bring 
an effective motion to dismiss, every case has settlement value, not for merits reasons, but 
because the cost of paying an attorneys’ fee to settle litigation . . . exceeds the cost in terms 
of dollars and time consumed of going through the discovery process . . . .”). 
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Moreover, loyal controllers with a genuine belief in the value of their 
idiosyncratic vision may expect to benefit from a reallocation mostly 
through their pro rata share of any positive effect such reallocation would 
have on firm value. Courts, however, might insist on having the control-
ler—and not the company—bear the cost if the reallocation is found to be 
unfair.168 Thus, entire fairness litigation might place the competent and 
loyal controller at an inherent disadvantage.169 
Ultimately, the possibility that courts will be unsympathetic to a con-
trolling shareholder’s claim of idiosyncratic vision will have a deterrent 
effect, which will transform the entire fairness standard into a de facto 
requirement to receive majority-of-minority support to avoid the uncer-
tainty of the valuation. With the odds stacked against them in this way, a 
controlling shareholder is left with no meaningful choice other than to 
seek MFW protection. In other words, although the controller is formally 
allowed to unilaterally reallocate control rights, practically, because of the 
lack of objective valuation methods, minority shareholders will always be 
given a veto right because a sensible controlling shareholder will make a 
reallocation of control contingent on their approval. 
An inherently speculative and unpredictable judicial valuation is 
unlikely to reduce either the risk of agency costs or that of losing idiosyn-
cratic vision. To the contrary, it will add litigation costs and an additional 
risk of judicial mistakes. Subsequently, courts’ inability to value control 
rights means that they should not assess the fairness of reallocations of 
control rights. In the absence of economic models for valuing different 
allocations of control rights, there is no reason to expect judicial review to 
produce an optimal allocation of these rights. The parties cannot rely on 
judicial review to ameliorate the inherent tension they face and must 
therefore themselves choose between the risk of high agency costs and that 
of losing idiosyncratic vision. 
2. Voluntary MFW Conditions. — The analysis so far has assumed that 
subjecting midstream reallocations of control rights to judicial review 
would require courts to value the new allocation of control rights. One 
may argue, however, that this assumption overlooks the current state of 
Delaware’s entire fairness regime. After all, Delaware courts often forgo 
entire fairness review (and judicial valuation) by encouraging controlling 
 
 168. During the Google settlement hearing, the court repeatedly criticized the failure 
to have the founders personally share the settlement costs. For example, see Settlement 
Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *27, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder Litig., No. 7469-
CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“So what you’re telling me here in 
terms of the settlement is that the founders who wish to retain voting control but not by 
continuing to purchase shares with an economic interest and preserving that voting control 
that way, they’re not taking any haircut in this.”). 
 169. Limiting courts to issuing only injunctions might mitigate the deterrence of con-
trollers. But, as explained in note 166, supra, and in note 202, infra, such a regime might 
still produce undesirable outcomes. 
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shareholders to voluntarily condition the execution of a self-dealing trans-
action upon receiving the support of a majority of the minority sharehold-
ers and the approval of an independent special committee. With these 
conditions—the MFW conditions170—in place, courts will grant the deal 
review under the deferential business judgment standard and accordingly 
abstain from assessing the fairness of the transaction.171 At first blush, this 
regime ostensibly sidesteps the problems inherent in judicial valuation of 
control rights: The majority-of-minority requirement relies on the minor-
ity shareholders’ competence to value the proposed transaction, and 
courts only supervise the approval process to ensure that it was uncoerced, 
informed, and that a majority of disinterested shareholders approved the 
deal.172 This section explains why the MFW conditions of the Delaware 
regime, by themselves, cannot overcome the need for a reliable model to 
guide courts in valuing control rights. 
a. Majority-of-Minority Condition. — Delaware doctrine does not require 
controllers to subject a self-dealing transaction to a vote by minority share-
holders. Rather, it provides the controller with an option: The controller 
can either subject the transaction to a vote by minority shareholders or 
have the court review the transaction for its fairness.173 The controller will 
therefore compare the possible outcome of negotiating with minority 
shareholders—including the risk of a negotiation failure—against the out-
come that judicial valuation is likely to produce. If the controlling share-
holder anticipates that minority shareholders will behave strategically and 
hold out for an unreasonable price or fail to approve a value-enhancing 
transaction for any other reason, the controller can avoid the negotiations 
altogether, force the transaction upon the minority, and simply opt to show 
in court that the price is fair under the entire fairness review.174 
Moreover, minority shareholders’ willingness to approve the pro-
posed transaction will also be affected by the controller’s option to “walk 
away” from negotiations and go forward with the transaction without the 
minority’s approval. In other words, under Delaware’s voluntary MFW 
conditions, both parties, the controller and the minority shareholders, 
negotiate “in the shadow” of Delaware’s fair-price requirement. This judi-
cial benchmark affects the parties’ bargaining strategies, as each side will 
 
 170. See supra section I.A.2. 
 171. See, e.g., In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 502. 
 172. See, e.g., id. at 525–26. 
 173. See Edward B. Rock, Majority of the Minority Approval in a World of Active 
Shareholders, in The Law and Finance of Related Party Transactions 105, 115 (Luca 
Enriques & Tobias Tröger eds., 2019). 
 174. For a discussion of the link between controllers’ need to test the market and the 
requirement that the controller adopt the majority-of-minority condition at the outset of 
negotiations, see William Lawlor & Michael Darby, Synutra—A Practical Application of MFW 
or a Free Look for Controlling Stockholders?, Harv. Law Sch. Forum on Corp. Governance, 
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/11/08/synutra-a-practical-application-of-mfw-or-a-free-
look-for-controlling-stockholders [https://perma.cc/PR79-YL9Q]. 
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base its demands on its estimate of the valuation result a court would reach 
if it were asked to determine the “fair price.”175 The judicial backstop, rest-
ing on both parties’ ability to predict how the court will evaluate the deal, 
incentivizes both the controlling and minority shareholders to reach an 
agreement. The looming presence of judicial valuation also prevents a 
negotiation breakdown, as the controller cannot offer too little and the 
minority cannot demand too much compared to the predictable outcome 
of “entire fairness” review.176 The dynamic changes, however, when courts 
cannot objectively value control rights. When both parties lack confidence 
in courts’ ability to objectively value control rights, the shadow of credible 
judicial valuation evaporates and the incentive to remain at the bargaining 
table is dramatically curtailed. Neither party can predict what the “fair 
price” will be, which renders the focal point of the negotiation elusive. 
This analysis shows that Delaware’s partial reliance on some type of 
veto right for minority shareholders to regulate self-dealing is in fact more 
dependent on accurate valuation than may be immediately apparent. 
Thus, Delaware’s most recent approach to the reallocation of control 
rights is problematic. In Crane, the court held that entire fairness applied, 
and used the MFW conditions to reduce the level of review to business 
judgment.177 Given NRG’s successful implementation of the MFW condi-
tions, the court was not required to assess the recapitalization’s fairness.178 
However, if NRG had failed to condition the recapitalization on a vote by 
minority shareholders, the court would have been left in the position of 
reviewing the reallocation of control rights under entire fairness.179 But 
without a valuation model, how could the court determine whether the 
reallocation was indeed fair? 
Moreover, Crane was an exceptional case in which the controller was 
likely to secure the majority-of-minority vote without the difficulties iden-
tified above.180 The company in Crane was an entity that owned income-
producing energy assets.181 It had no management of its own and instead 
 
 175. Indeed, an empirical study has found that the premium paid under the MFW pro-
cedure is similar to the premium determined by courts under the entire fairness process. 
See Fernán Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and Deal Outcomes in 
Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW 24 (Jan. 19, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3105169 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
 176. In other words, the ability to turn to the Delaware courts for an objective valuation 
makes the parties more likely to reach an agreement in which the minority “sells” litigation 
insurance to the controlling shareholder in exchange for a larger percentage of the surplus 
value generated by the deal. Goshen, supra note 47, at 429. 
 177. See supra notes 99–104 and accompanying text. 
 178. IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, No. CV 12742-CB, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017). 
 179. The same result would follow if Delaware chose to afford the recapitalization busi-
ness judgment deference and the company had failed to meet one of the required condi-
tions for such review. See infra note 213. 
 180. See supra section I.B.2. 
 181. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *1–2. 
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relied on its controlling shareholder, through a “Management Services 
Agreement,” to manage its day-to-day affairs, including placing new energy 
assets, which are routinely and easily evaluated, into the company.182 Thus, 
in Crane, the need for the operator to preserve control as the company 
continued to acquire assets was an operational issue rather than a question 
of idiosyncratic vision.183 That is, the controller was not making appeals to 
the company’s vision as Page and Brin were in Google’s case, but rather to 
the need to ensure that Crane’s regular operations were run successfully. 
In this way, Crane was an anomalous situation because it was easy to explain 
to the minority shareholders that reallocation of control rights was needed 
to prevent the fairly immediate negative consequences that could result if 
the controller-operator lost control. In other cases, however, where the 
controller’s idiosyncratic vision is at issue, persuading minority sharehold-
ers to vote for the reallocation of control rights will not be as easy.184 
To summarize, the MFW majority-of-minority condition takes on a dif-
ferent meaning when courts cannot evaluate the fairness of the underlying 
transaction. As explained above, the parties must choose between allowing 
the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights and subjecting the 
reallocation to a veto right by minority shareholders. If courts require the 
majority-of-minority support to avoid valuation of reallocation of control 
rights, then in cases in which the parties gave the controller the right to 
unilaterally reallocate control rights, the judicial requirement practically 
overrules the parties’ choice by mandating a veto right to the minority 
shareholders. 
b. Special Independent Committee. — In addition to voluntarily asking 
for majority-of-minority support as explained above, under MFW, control-
lers that wish to avoid entire fairness review must empower a special com-
mittee of independent directors to negotiate the transaction and approve 
its terms.185 Indeed, the requirement that independent directors approve 
decisions that raise conflicts of interest is common in corporate law.186 
However, in the context of reallocation of control rights, even this require-
ment is problematic. 
 
 182. Id. at *2. 
 183. See id. at *3–4 (describing the company’s dependence on the controlling share-
holder as a source of assets). 
 184. See supra section I.B.2. 
 185. In re MFW S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 517 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Kahn 
v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); see also supra notes 171–172 and 
accompanying text. 
 186. For example, in both Crane and the Google settlement, courts emphasized the sig-
nificance of having the recapitalization negotiated and approved by a special committee of 
independent directors. See Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9 (suggesting that the presence of 
well-motivated and truly independent directors might play an important role in determining 
the scope of judicial review); supra note 94 (describing then-Chancellor Strine’s acknowl-
edgement that approval of the recapitalization plan by Google’s independent directors was 
the company’s strongest argument for adjusting the standard of review). 
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Ideally, a special committee of independent directors should verify 
that the controller indeed has the idiosyncratic vision to justify the higher 
risk of agency costs that come with a reallocation of control rights. This 
means that the usefulness of a special independent committee depends on 
its ability to ascertain the real value of idiosyncratic vision, which requires 
that such vision be verifiable. But, because of the subjective nature of 
idiosyncratic vision, it is inherently nonverifiable.187 Otherwise there would 
be few differences of opinion between controllers and minority share-
holders. Moreover, for the reasons explained in section II.B, directors—
like courts—would be unable to rely on valuation experts to offer an 
objective assessment of the value of the company under the new allocation 
of control rights. If it were possible to generate such an objective valuation, 
courts would also be able to do so. 
As a result, the role of a special committee of independent directors 
would ultimately boil down to deciding whether to put their faith in the 
controller’s claims based on their knowledge of the controller’s compe-
tence and integrity. While the directors’ access to nonpublic information 
may allow them to observe the controller’s behavior on a variety of occa-
sions, there is nothing to suggest that independent directors enjoy any 
advantage over Delaware’s judges in decoding the human traits relevant 
here: competence (vision) and integrity (agency costs). As such, the inher-
ent tension between idiosyncratic vision and agency costs will render the 
special independent committee impractical, as the directors’ mere trust in 
the controller cannot translate to validation of the existence of idiosyn-
cratic vision. 
Lastly, Delaware’s tendency to focus on the process of the independent 
special committee might transform the process into a “cosmetic” negotia-
tion solely aimed at meeting the judicial desire to see give-and-take 
between the controllers and the independent directors.188 To illustrate, 
consider the Facebook and Google recapitalizations. Although the true 
consideration for the reallocation of control rights is the promise of 
increased value, the independent directors in these cases negotiated for 
 
 187. See Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 601 (“[A]symmet-
ric information and differences of opinion could prevent the controller-entrepreneur from 
credibly communicating her idiosyncratic vision not only to investors, but also to skeptical 
independent board members.”). Another concern is independent directors’ dependence 
on the controller for continued service at the company. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra 
note 46, at 1274. 
 188. When the board approves a corporate action that amounts to doing the controller 
a favor, such as waiving transfer of control conditions to facilitate the sale of the controller’s 
shares, courts have required that the board negotiate receiving something in return. See, 
e.g., In re Digex Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176, 1210–11 (Del. Ch. 2000) (finding that 
the defendant company was likely to fail the fair dealing prong of fiduciary duty because 
independent directors were “kept powerless” to affect negotiations in a merger proposal 
controlled by interested directors). In the context of reallocation of control rights, however, 
controllers are not asking for a favor, but rather for a corporate action they believe would 
benefit the company. 
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“concessions” from the controllers in the form of additional contractual 
restrictions on their control rights.189 Yet, when these concessions are seri-
ously considered, it becomes evident that they were merely put in place to 
satisfy the court’s desire to see some compromise between the parties. 
In sum, the lack of valuation methods for reallocation of control 
rights limits judicial application of the voluntary MFW conditions, as the 
tools of entire fairness used to resolve cash-flow rights conflicts will not 
work in the context of control rights conflicts. 
3. The Intermediate Approach. — One might wonder if this Article goes 
too far in eliminating judicial review. Even if entire fairness cannot be ap-
plied in the absence of objective valuation methodologies, the argument 
goes, perhaps courts could still play a useful role in adjudicating disputes 
over the reallocation of control rights. Under this view, courts could adopt 
an intermediate standard of review—one in between entire fairness and 
business judgment—that does not require valuation, to prevent controllers 
from overreaching. Consequently, this view reasons, intermediate review 
by Delaware’s equity court would avoid the complexities of entire fairness 
valuations while arguably preventing at least some egregious cases in which 
midstream reallocations are driven purely by agency costs. 
This approach is familiar to corporate law scholars. Delaware courts 
have implemented intermediate standards of review in other contexts in 
which business judgment review seems too deferential and the entire fair-
ness standard seems too strict. For example, in assessing defensive 
measures that directors take in response to a hostile takeover, Delaware 
requires the board to show a good faith determination that there was a 
threat and that the defense was proportional (the Unocal test).190 In 
assessing a board action that interferes with shareholders’ voting rights, 
Delaware courts require that the board show a compelling justification 
(the Blasius test).191 The main role of these intermediate tests is to provide 
pre-transaction litigation, in which courts typically either block the deal or 
let it go through because of some legal standard rather than because of an 
objective valuation. 
At least at first glance, the intermediate standard seems to avoid judi-
cial valuation issues and achieve an improved balance between the risks 
that parties aim to minimize: high agency costs and the loss of idiosyncratic 
 
 189. See supra notes 87–98 and accompanying text. 
 190. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
 191. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988) (explaining 
that when a board action is “done for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of 
stockholder voting power” past cases have articulated that “the board bears the heavy bur-
den of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action”). Delaware courts use a 
similar approach to evaluate board decisions to sell control of a company (the Revlon test). 
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) 
(“[W]hen bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes 
inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing favorites with 
the contending factions.”). 
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vision. A closer look at the Delaware courts’ application of these interme-
diate standards, however, highlights their inherent shortcomings. Con-
sider, for instance, the Blasius standard, which requires that a corporate 
board have a compelling justification when the primary purpose of a cor-
porate action is to interfere with the shareholders’ vote.192 Indeed, it was 
already clear from the facts of Blasius itself that even a good faith attempt 
to protect the firm from a financial disaster would not satisfy the compel-
ling justification test.193 As courts have acknowledged the practical impos-
sibility of providing a goal that would satisfy Blasius’s requirements, their 
focus has shifted from the board’s goal to the means that it used to accom-
plish the challenged interference with a shareholder vote.194 The test has 
evolved into a list of permitted and prohibited actions, allowing the board 
to regulate but not dictate the shareholder vote.195 Scholars and judges seem 
to agree that, in the already very limited circumstances when the Blasius 
standard applies, cases in which the court has found the compelling justi-
fication burden met are exceedingly rare, if not entirely nonexistent.196 
Thus, in the Blasius context, the intermediate standard of review simply 
means a judicially imposed prohibition on board interference with the 
shareholder vote. 
The other form of intermediate scrutiny, the Unocal test, focuses on 
the motives of the boards that use defensive measures.197 Since a well-
advised board can prepare an adequate paper trail showing the right 
 
 192. Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661. 
 193. Id. at 653–59 (finding that the board acted “in a good faith effort to protect its 
incumbency, not selfishly, but in order to thwart implementation of the recapitalization that 
it feared, reasonably, would cause great injury to the Company”). 
 194. David C. McBride & Danielle Gibbs, Interference with Voting Rights: The 
Metaphysics of Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 927, 942 (2001) (“The 
court never has found a justification sufficiently compelling to permit a board to thwart the 
shareholder franchise.”). 
 195. Compare Pell v. Kill, 135 A.3d 764, 789 (Del. Ch. 2016) (“Pell has established a 
reasonable probability of showing successfully that the Board Reduction Plan is preclusive. 
Pell has therefore established a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits on a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty under the enhanced scrutiny standard.”), with Mercier v. Inter-
Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 788 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“[D]irectors fearing that stockholders 
are about to make an unwise decision that [risks the stockholders] . . . irrevocably los[ing] 
a unique opportunity to receive a premium for their shares have a compelling justification—
the protection of their stockholders’ financial best interests—for a short postponement in 
the merger voting process . . . .”). 
 196. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
 197. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985). Some 
defensive measures such as a poison pill indirectly affect shareholders’ voting rights (pre-
venting some shareholders from increasing their ownership of voting shares), and realloca-
tion of control rights could also be viewed in such a way (preventing control from shifting 
to the market). 
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motives, the Unocal standard has essentially evolved into business judg-
ment review for companies that hire sophisticated counsel.198 Thus, in the 
Unocal context, the intermediate standard of review simply means a judi-
cially imposed default rule according to which the use of defensive 
measures is allowed. 
The failings of existing intermediate standards to produce meaning-
ful judicial review should be instructive. Any prospect that subjecting mid-
stream allocation of control rights to an intermediate standard of review 
would provide a silver bullet seems to fly in the face of Delaware’s actual 
practice. Assume, like in Unocal, that the intermediate test used to regulate 
control rights focuses on both the motives of the controllers, as well as the 
process used to make the decision.199 A well-advised controller can always 
prepare the “right” paper trail to show a good motive for maintaining con-
trol: the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision. And, as explained above, by its very 
nature the objective value of idiosyncratic vision—or even its existence—
cannot be verified by courts.200 This means that only the poorly advised or 
naive controllers will be captured by the test. The same fate awaits any 
process-related inquiry. In this regard, the story of Facebook is illuminat-
ing. There, the plaintiffs alleged, after discovery, that the special commit-
tee procedure had been compromised in part because one of the members 
of the committee had sent Mark Zuckerberg text messages updating him 
on the status of the special committee’s meetings.201 Even if the litigation 
had continued and Delaware had in fact found that the special committee 
was compromised, the next well-advised company proposing a recapitali-
zation would learn the lesson and quickly avoid Facebook’s mistake. 
The same outcome can be expected if the intermediate test takes the 
approach of Blasius and focuses on the goal of reallocating control rights. 
Indeed, one might think that reallocations of control rights could be 
 
 198. Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. 
L. 599, 617 (2013) (“Underneath this veneer of judicial review, however, is convincing evi-
dence that Delaware courts, in reality, heavily defer to the decision of the target directors.”); 
see also Mercier, 929 A.2d at 810 (“[S]ome of the prior Unocal case law gave reason to fear 
that that standard, and the related Revlon standard, were being denuded into simply another 
name for business judgment rule review.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 199. See, e.g., Air Products v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 103 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that 
the first prong of Unocal requires directors-defendants to show that after “reasonable inves-
tigation” they determined in “good faith” that the bidder’s offer presented a threat). 
 200. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. One might argue that the success of 
the company could indicate the value of the entrepreneur’s vision. Yet, business failures 
(temporary or not) do not necessarily imply that the entrepreneur lacks vision. In fact, con-
trol matters for the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision precisely when investors or markets believe 
that the controller’s vision is wrong. 
 201. See Deepa Seetharaman & Sarah E. Needleman, Facebook Abandons Plans to 
Change Share Structure, Avoiding Lawsuit, Wall St. J. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/facebook-abandons-plans-to-change-share-structure-avoiding-lawsuit-1506114877 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (“In one instance, Mr. Andreessen texted Mr. Zuckerberg 
during a March meeting of the special committee with progress reports. ‘NOW WE’RE 
COOKING WITH GAS,’ Mr. Andreessen wrote.”). 
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viewed through the Blasius framework as an incident of interference with 
shareholder voting rights. Again, well-advised controllers will state and 
demonstrate the pursuit of idiosyncratic vision as their goal. As the court 
in Blasius rejected the board’s good faith goal of avoiding financial disaster 
as a qualified compelling justification, there is no reason to think that the 
goal of pursuing idiosyncratic vision would be treated differently. However, 
in cases of reallocation of control rights the court will not be able to come 
up with a list of permitted and restricted actions because all reallocations 
have the same effect of shifting control from one group of shareholders to 
another. And the court cannot prohibit all reallocations of control rights, 
as such a ruling will run counter to the parties’ agreement to allow the 
controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights in genuine cases of pur-
suit of idiosyncratic vision. Practically, an intermediate test will gradually 
transform into business judgment review. 
One might argue that the risk of intermediate litigation, on its own, 
might deter some disloyal controllers from ever trying to go through with 
opportunistic reallocation of control rights. After all, lawyers cannot justify 
every action, and the need to persuade professional courts, with the costs 
involved in the process, might deter some expropriation from taking 
place. However, this speculative benefit should be weighed against the 
potential costs arising out of possible judicial mistakes. In the absence of a 
methodologically sound tool for distinguishing between “good” and “bad” 
reallocations of control rights, the likelihood of mistakes is very high. 
Thus, the prospect of costly litigation under an intermediate standard of 
review will deter even legitimate, value-maximizing reallocations by con-
trollers with idiosyncratic vision. Given the high probability of mistakes, 
even if all controllers litigate midstream reallocations and courts merely 
engage in judicial screening—granting injunctions or allowing the action 
to go through—an intermediate standard of review might harm the mar-
ket by allowing some “bad” reallocations to go through and stopping some 
“good” ones.202 
 
 202. To see why, assume again that there are 100 controlled firms in the market traded 
at $100 each. See supra note 166. As previously stipulated in this Article, only twenty-five of 
the 100 would wish to reallocate control rights, and of those twenty-five, only five have con-
trollers with idiosyncratic vision. If one of these five firms reallocates control rights it would 
add $100 in firm value. However, in the other twenty firms, any reallocation of control rights 
would result in the controller inflicting an average of $20 damage due to agency costs. 
Courts are aware that only five out of twenty-five firms would have idiosyncratic vision. Thus, 
there is a 20% probability that courts will believe that a controller has idiosyncratic vision 
and would allow a reallocation to go through, while in 80% of the cases the court will issue 
an injunction against the reallocation of control rights. To underscore the dangers of an 
erroneous determination, notice the outcome of applying the statistical probabilities 
assumed above within each group. If 80% of the twenty firms that yield high agency costs 
and 80% of the five firms that yield gains from idiosyncratic vision come before the court, 
the following is the result: Courts would likely block sixteen of the firms that have no idio-
syncratic vision (avoiding $320 in damage), but they would also block four of the firms with 
idiosyncratic vision (losing $400 in value). At the same time, taking 20% from each of the 
groups, courts would likely allow four firms (20% of twenty) with agency costs to go through 
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B. Implications for Corporate Law 
Section III.A argues that Delaware courts should not review realloca-
tions of control rights for their fairness or institute a new intermediate 
standard of review. This section claims that this leaves courts with the task 
of determining whether the controller has the power to unilaterally real-
locate control rights. If the court finds that the controller has the power 
to make a midstream reallocation of control rights without the need for a 
vote by minority shareholders, then it should apply the business judgment 
rule.203 Otherwise, the court should enforce the right of the minority 
shareholders to veto the reallocation. 
1. Deferring to the Parties’ Choice. — Controllers and minority share-
holders face an inherent tradeoff between two opposing concerns. On the 
one hand, allowing the controller to unilaterally reallocate control rights 
might lead to opportunistic control allocations that would benefit the con-
troller without increasing company value. On the other hand, a require-
ment that minority shareholders approve reallocations of control rights 
might lead to a bargaining failure and prevent controllers from realizing 
their idiosyncratic visions. As explained above, judicial review cannot ame-
liorate this tension. Instead, the parties must themselves choose between 
imperfect alternatives by agreeing ex ante on the rule that will govern mid-
stream reallocations of control rights. They can either agree that the con-
troller will hold the power to unilaterally reallocate control rights or that 
the minority’s approval is required, for example, by including a charter 
provision to that effect. In the first case they protect idiosyncratic vision, 
by strengthening the controllers’ freedom to pursue their idiosyncratic 
visions for the company regardless of investors’ views, and risk agency 
costs, by increasing the controllers’ abilities to expropriate control. In the 
second case, they minimize the risk of agency costs but risk losing idiosyn-
cratic vision. 
This Article takes no position on the optimal allocation of the power 
to reallocate control rights, as it is inherently firm specific and individual 
specific. In our view, the best approach for corporate law is to (1) allow the 
 
(allowing $80 in damage) and one firm (20% of five) with idiosyncratic vision to go through 
(keeping $100 value). This would damage the market as courts will avoid $340 in damages 
(preventing $320 in agency costs and preserving $20 in value) at the cost of losing $400 in 
idiosyncratic vision. Since these mistakes reduce value (blocking idiosyncratic vision or 
allowing agency costs), this result is damaging even to shareholders holding a diversified 
portfolio. 
 203. See supra section III.A. One could argue that the parties may incorporate the pro-
spect of judicial review into their initial allocation of the power to reallocate control rights. 
For example, minority shareholders might leave the power with the controller under the 
assumption that its use of the power will be constrained by judicial review. As this Article 
explains, however, it is highly unlikely that the parties would like to subject midstream reallo-
cation of control rights to judicial review based on an unreliable method for assessing 
fairness. See id. 
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parties ex ante to determine who should have the power to reallocate con-
trol rights and (2) judicially settle ex post disputes about whether the con-
troller has the power to reallocate these rights without a vote by minority 
shareholders. The principal task of courts is therefore to determine 
whether the controller can reallocate control rights without receiving the 
approval of the minority shareholders. 
In some cases, the parties may expressly address the question in the 
company’s charter or other foundational document. For instance, the 
charter may require that minority shareholders approve any reallocation 
of control rights by providing that certain charter amendments receive a 
supermajority vote or, in the case of a dual-class company, a so-called class 
vote.204 Alternatively, the charter may expressly authorize the controller to 
make future changes without a vote by the majority-of-the-minority.205 If 
controllers and investors agree ex ante on an allocation of control in the 
corporate charter that empowers the controller to recapitalize the firm, 
subsequent judicial rewriting of this allocation runs directly counter to the 
ex ante motivation for entering into this type of arrangement. Courts 
should not determine the fairness of midstream reallocations or review the 
motives of the controller. The only role for courts faced with disputes over 
the reallocation of control rights is to enforce the parties’ arrangement for 
who has the power to reallocate control rights.206 When the controller has 
the right to unilaterally reallocate control rights, the business judgment 
rule should apply to its decision to reallocate these rights. In other words, 
the controller’s conflict of interest notwithstanding, courts should not 
treat the reallocation as self-dealing. As explained in Part II, the lack of 
acceptable valuation methodologies prevents courts from distinguishing 
between value-enhancing and value-reducing allocations of control rights. 
The Delaware case that best reflects the approach outlined in this sec-
tion is eBay. In eBay, the Delaware Chancery Court declined to review a 
corporate governance decision that clearly benefited the controllers—the 
implementation of a staggered board that effectively denied board repre-
sentation to the minority shareholder—under the entire fairness stand-
ard.207 This case fits an approach focused on charter interpretation not 
 
 204. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 
729232, at *1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (describing a case in which the “deal was conditioned 
on a majority of the publicly held Class A shares being voted in favor, and a successful vote 
to amend the [company] Charter to allow [the controller] to receive the differential”). 
 205. See Andrew William Winden, Sunrise, Sunset: An Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures, 2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 852, 913 & n.156 (not-
ing that Blue Apron, Inc. authorized the issuance of future nonvoting shares in the IPO 
charter). 
 206. As the optimal allocation of the power to relocate control rights is company spe-
cific, courts may be asked by minority shareholders to read implied limitations on the con-
troller’s power into specific charter provisions at specific companies. 
 207. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 37 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“I am not 
persuaded that entire fairness review applies to the Staggered Board Amendments . . . .”); see 
also supra section I.B.1. 
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only because it applied the business judgment rule to a midstream reallo-
cation of control rights, but also because the court emphasized that apply-
ing the entire fairness standard would contradict the parties’ initial deci-
sion to provide the controllers with the right to unilaterally implement this 
change: 
The right to amend the [C]raigslist charter, however, without 
eBay’s consent if eBay chose to compete with [C]raigslist was a 
benefit Jim and Craig negotiated for and secured in the 
Shareholders’ Agreement. Section 8.3 [of the Shareholders’ 
Agreement] plainly articulates that benefit. Thus, the Staggered 
Board Amendments cannot be inequitable because they were 
exactly the sort of consequence eBay accepted would occur if 
eBay decided to compete with [C]raigslist.208 
As such, the court plainly stated that the plaintiffs were “seek[ing] to ob-
tain a benefit [they were] not able to obtain” in negotiations for the 
“Shareholders’ Agreement.”209 
Moreover, this Article’s approach is also consistent with Williams v. 
Geier, in which the Delaware Supreme Court granted business judgment 
review to a controlled public company that adopted a charter amendment 
creating “tenure shares” resulting in an effect similar to that achieved 
through a dual-class structure.210 The Williams plaintiffs argued that “the 
action of the Board in recommending the Amendment and 
Recapitalization to the stockholders constituted either a breach of fiduci-
ary duty or an impermissible effort at entrenchment, both of which are 
claimed to rebut the business judgment presumption and implicate entire 
fairness review.”211 The court squarely rejected this contention, even while 
acknowledging the possibility that the majority shareholders would benefit 
more from the recapitalization than the minority shareholders.212 As 
explained above, similar rulings were given in the other cases detailed in 
section I.B.1. Yet, all of these cases reach results similar to the approach 
recommended in this Article—deferring to the allocation of control rights 
outlined in the corporate charter—without explicitly adopting this 
Article’s reasoning.213 Expressly explaining that this outcome is the result 
 
 208. eBay, 16 A.3d at 39. 
 209. Id. 
 210. See supra section I.B.1. 
 211. Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1378 (Del. 1996). 
 212. Id. at 1385. 
 213. Although these cases reached a conclusion that conforms with this Article’s recom-
mendation, they continue to subject the outcome to judicial discretion by relying on the 
business judgment rule. See supra section I.B.1. This is problematic because the business 
judgment rule reverts to entire fairness if one of the conditions for its application fails. See 
Williams, 671 A.2d at 1384. Thus, granting companies business judgment review in realloca-
tions of control rights only works if the companies “get it right”; if they fail, then the court 
will again be forced to evaluate the recapitalization under the fairness standard. This 
Article’s approach calls on Delaware to address the question as one of charter interpretation 
rather than one of judicial review. 
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of the controller’s right to reallocate control rights will importantly 
provide the market with better guidance. 
Lastly, the analysis here also applies to the CBS dispute. This Article 
contends that if the dispute had not settled, the court should have focused 
on the parties’ ex ante arrangements about the allocation of power con-
cerning midstream reallocation of control rights. As the default rule in 
controlled companies is that the controller’s control is protected by a 
property rule,214 the only way to justify the board’s discretion to take con-
trol rights from the controller is to find that the controller had agreed ex 
ante to grant the board such a power. The extent to which this was the case 
was disputed in the CBS litigation.215 But, if the controller had indeed so 
agreed, the business judgment rule should apply to the board’s decision 
to dilute the controller, without any further review of the board’s 
discretion. 
The proposal to defer to the parties’ choice is driven by the need to 
respect the rights of sophisticated parties to adopt the corporate arrange-
ment that is most tailored to their needs. In the control rights context, this 
need is reinforced by the recognition that no arrangement is generally 
superior. Rather, the parties must choose between two imperfect alterna-
tives. Moreover, a clear statement from courts indicating that they will 
defer to the parties’ initial choice—rather than attempt to assess ex post 
the fairness of the reallocation of control rights—will signal to parties the 
need to choose at the outset the arrangements that will govern midstream 
reallocation of control rights. In the case of public companies with a dual-
class structure, for example, investors could insist on expanding the scope 
of class voting rights. 
In the past, corporate law scholars were skeptical about the claim that 
governance arrangements adopted at the IPO stage are optimal.216 In 
recent decades, however, there has been a dramatic rise in the power of 
institutional investors, which now own most of the shares of publicly traded 
corporations in the United States.217 These sophisticated investors are able 
 
 214. Goshen & Hamdani, Idiosyncratic Vision, supra note 28, at 601. 
 215. The CBS plaintiffs argued that “the fact that the certificate of incorporation of CBS 
(and Viacom), unlike those of some other controlled companies, authorizes the Board to 
approve a stock dividend that would dilute NAI’s voting power is itself evidence of CBS’s 
commitment to independent board governance.” CBS Corp. v. Nat’l Amusements, Inc., No. 
2018-0342-AGB, 2018 WL 2263385, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018). The defendants disagreed. 
Id. The court stated that it was “express[ing] no opinion” on this interpretation. Id. 
 216. See, e.g., Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm 
Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83, 110–13 (2001) (attempting 
to develop conclusions as to why inefficient antitakeover provisions are included in IPO-
stage charters). 
 217. See Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 263, 304–07 (2019) (describing the growth of pension funds, mutual funds, and insur-
ance companies as shareholders of publicly traded corporations). 
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to negotiate governance terms and prices with any firm wishing to go pub-
lic.218 Furthermore, at least for companies with a dual-class share structure, 
the IPO market for governance terms seems to be quite an active one. To 
begin, although many founders would clearly like to go public with a dual-
class structure, only a minority of firms succeed.219 Additionally, dual-class 
companies that go public exhibit a considerable variety of governance 
arrangements in their charters, providing different provisions regarding 
the allocation of power between controllers and minority shareholders.220 
This variety suggests that founders cannot simply dictate governance terms 
and that some form of bargaining between founders and investors does 
take place at the IPO stage. Thus, whatever charter arrangements the par-
ties have made as to midstream reallocation of control rights should be 
respected. 
2. A Default Rule. — The approach explained in section III.B.1 would 
require Delaware courts to identify the parties’ choice concerning the 
power to reallocate control rights. Delaware courts often address disputes 
over charter interpretation,221 and the rules that guide courts when they 
interpret corporate charters will not be revisited here. However, how 
should courts decide cases in which the process of charter interpretation 
provides no answer on the parties’ agreement on the issue of control 
rights? And what should be the default rule? 
There is substantial literature about what types of default rules are 
optimal;222 this literature will not be reviewed here. Instead, this section 
focuses on the inherent tradeoff implicating the choice of a default rule 
for midstream reallocations of control rights. As explained above, the two 
possible rules are imperfect. The rule allowing the controller to unilater-
ally reallocate control rights will increase both the expected benefit from 
idiosyncratic vision and the expected loss from agency costs. The rule 
 
 218. See id. 
 219. See Council of Institutional Inv’rs, Dual-Class IPO Snapshot: 2017–2018 Statistics, 
https://www.cii.org/files/2018Y%20IPO%20Stats%20for%20Website.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YXT9-3V7P] (last updated Jan. 2, 2019) (showing that in 2017, only nineteen percent of 
IPOs had dual-class structures). 
 220. Winden, supra note 205, at 860 (conducting an empirical study of the charter pro-
visions of dual-class companies). 
 221. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. CIV.A. 7144-VCG, 2012 WL 
729232, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 2012) (holding that the controller lacked the power to pro-
pose a charter amendment that would entitle it to a control premium). 
 222. For literature on default rules in contracts, see generally David Charny, 
Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1815 (1991); Symposium, Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. Cal. 
Interdisciplinary L.J. 1 (1993). For default rules in corporate law, see Michael Klausner, 
Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757, 826–34 (1995) 
(examining how to design corporate defaults in light of network externalities); Ian Ayres, 
Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1391, 1397–400 (1992) (reviewing Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991)) (discussing how to design corporate law 
defaults in light of information-forcing considerations). 
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providing the minority with a veto right will decrease both the expected 
benefit from idiosyncratic vision and the expected loss from agency costs. 
The expected value of each rule is the sum of both effects. Accordingly, if 
the expected benefits from idiosyncratic vision are higher than the 
expected loss from agency costs, the default rule should allow the control-
ler to unilaterally reallocate control rights, and vice versa.223 
For many years Delaware law had a single uniform default:224 Share-
holders holding a majority of the votes can unilaterally amend the corpo-
rate charter.225 Indeed, in a long line of cases, described in section I.B.1 
and illustrated most prominently by Williams v. Geier,226 Delaware con-
cluded that the controller has the authority to unilaterally reallocate 
control rights and accordingly applied the business judgment rule. Unfor-
tunately, this simple default lost its certainty during Google’s 2012 
settlement hearing227 and culminated in the application of the entire fair-
ness test in Crane.228 This development might have altered Delaware’s de 
facto default rule. While the application of the business judgment rule in 
earlier cases granted the controller the power to unilaterally reallocate 
control rights, the application of the entire fairness standard in the recent 
cases has practically granted the minority shareholders a veto right over 
reallocation of control rights. 
 
 223. The analysis in the text discusses in the abstract the benefit from idiosyncratic 
vision and the loss from agency costs. A fuller account would also consider the likelihood 
that, given the difficulties that were identified above, minority shareholders would fail to 
approve value-enhancing reallocation of control rights. 
 224. The optimal default does not necessarily have to be identical across all types of 
control rights and all governance structures. For example, one default rule might apply to 
dual-class companies and another to companies with one-share-one-vote. This view might 
be reinforced by then-Chancellor Leo Strine’s comments at the Google settlement. See 
Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *38, In re Google Inc. Class C S’holder 
Litig., No. 7469-CS (Del. Ch. argued Oct. 28, 2013), 2013 WL 6735045 (“[F]rom the begin-
ning, everyone has been clear with the people who lined up in hoards . . . to buy Google 
stock, with the understanding that these founders were going public but with no . . . inten-
tion to relinquish voting control . . . and that when you invested in Google, that was sort of 
your understanding.”). Indeed, the stock exchange rules prohibit midstream changes from 
single- to dual-class shares. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for 
Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 103 Va. L. Rev. 585, 597 & n.35 (2017). 
 225. In dual-class companies, this default rule is supplemented by the Delaware default 
on the conditions under which a charter amendment requires a specific shareholder class 
vote. See Del. Code tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) (2019). Under Delaware law, in companies with more 
than one class of shares, a charter amendment would have to be approved by a class of shares 
if it would change “the powers, preferences, or special rights of the shares of such class so 
as to affect them adversely.” Id. For an analysis of the differences between the Delaware 
approach and that of the Model Business Corporations Law, see Michael P. Dooley & 
Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and 
the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 Bus. Law. 737, 750–52 (2001). 
 226. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 227. See Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at *37, In re Google Inc. Class C 
S’holder Litig., No. 7469-CS, 2013 WL 6735045. 
 228. See supra note 15. 
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The earlier Delaware cases applying the business judgment rule pre-
ferred the protection of idiosyncratic vision over the risk of agency costs.  
There is no evidence to justify changing this long-standing preference, 
especially for companies with a dual-class share structure. While the risk of 
agency costs is omnipresent, so is the promise of idiosyncratic vision. For 
instance, a 2018 study found that only a handful of the publicly traded 
firms are responsible for most of the return in the stock market. Specifi-
cally, “the best-performing 4% of listed companies explain the net gain for 
the entire US stock market since 1926, as other stocks collectively matched 
Treasury bills.”229 Given the wide variety of industries,230 and the large 
ninety-year window used, this study attests to the potential value of idiosyn-
cratic vision. After all, it is the idiosyncratic vision of entrepreneurs that 
allows their companies to produce returns that significantly outperform 
the market. Even if only some of the firms in that four percent group had 
managers with idiosyncratic vision, the market-wide costs from losing that 
vision would be substantial, thereby supporting a default rule that allows 
controllers to unilaterally reallocate control rights. 
Moreover, especially for dual-class companies, changing market reali-
ties provide another reason to question the change in the default rule sug-
gested by the recent Delaware cases. In the past, institutional investors 
were less powerful, more shares were held by retail investors, and few 
activist attacks or hostile takeovers took place. Thus, powerful CEOs prac-
tically enjoyed uncontestable control that allowed them to pursue their 
idiosyncratic vision without fear of removal by investors. Consequently, the 
unilateral power to reallocate control rights was less crucial to preserve 
idiosyncratic vision. Today, with the increasing dominance of institutional 
investors’ ownership and the rise of hedge fund activism, managers need 
formal control to pursue their idiosyncratic vision even when investors 
think that they are wrong,231 and the most effective tool to accomplish that 
end is a dual-class structure. In fact, in the recent decade the demand by 
entrepreneurs for, and the use of, dual-class structures has increased, sug-
gesting that, in today’s market environment, having legal incontestable 
control is increasingly perceived as essential for managers wishing to attain 
idiosyncratic vision.232 The recent Delaware cases proposing a change of 
 
 229. Hendrik Bessembinder, Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, 129 J. Fin. Econ. 
440, 440 (2018). 
 230. See id. at 454 tbl.5 for a summary of the fifty firms with the greatest creation of 
wealth for their shareholders. 
 231. See Goshen & Hannes, supra note 217, at 304–08 (arguing that the rise of institu-
tional investors and increased shareholder sophistication has lowered barriers to share-
holder action and increased shareholder influence). 
 232. See Bradford D. Jordan, Soohyung Kim & Mark H. Liu, Growth Opportunities, 
Short-Term Market Pressure, and Dual-Class Share Structure, 41 J. Corp. Fin. 304, 305 
(2016) (finding that “dual-class shares . . . can help managers focus on the implementation 
of long-term projects while avoiding short-term market pressure”). Unfortunately, the inev-
itable tension between agency costs and idiosyncratic vision cannot be resolved by the exist-
ing empirical studies on dual-class firms. Since these companies provide controllers with 
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the default rule go against the market reality in which it is more crucial to 
protect idiosyncratic vision by keeping the old default allowing unilateral 
reallocation of control rights. 
The optimal default rule regarding reallocation of control rights 
depends on the relative expected benefits of idiosyncratic vision compared 
to the expected losses from agency costs. Past Delaware cases adopted a 
default rule that favored idiosyncratic vision over agency costs. Given the 
current market realities, there is no compelling reason to change that 
default. 
CONCLUSION 
This point cannot be overstated: Without an objective valuation, 
entire fairness review collapses, as there is no way to determine the appro-
priate payment to impose upon a controlling shareholder for engaging in 
the proposed action. In the context of cash-flow disputes, objective valua-
tion has proven to be a fairly surmountable challenge. Cash flows are, 
intrinsically, readily capable of being assigned an objective fair value. Rely-
ing on techniques developed by financial economists—most commonly a 
DCF analysis—Delaware judges faced with cash-flow disputes engage in 
fairly complex valuation analyses to determine the fair value of a chal-
lenged transaction. Indeed, this practice has been codified into Delaware’s 
corporate code.233 In so doing, the Delaware courts have become 
renowned for their acumen in deploying the entire fairness standard bol-
stered by competent valuations. 
However, similar valuation techniques cannot be devised for control 
rights. These rights are simply too firm specific and individual specific to 
permit a reliable, objective valuation. Thus, in assessing the reallocation of 
control rights, courts are unable to use the legal tools that they have suc-
cessfully employed to resolve cash-flow conflicts. The entire fairness stand-
ard and Delaware’s voluntary MFW conditions both necessitate valuation 
models to operate. Similarly, if history is a guide, intermediate standards 
of review will also fail to provide any meaningful regulation and ultimately 
will devolve into business judgment review. As a result, Delaware is left with 
only one choice: to enforce the allocation of control rights for which par-
ties have bargained in the charter and to establish a default rule for cases 
in which the charter is silent on the issue of reallocation. This approach 
 
incontestable control, their relative performance or market valuation could indicate 
whether the benefits of securing founders’ ability to pursue their idiosyncratic visions 
exceed the loss from agency costs. However, empirical studies on the relative performance 
of dual-class firms have reached conflicting results. 
 233. Under Delaware law, “In determining such fair value, the Court shall take into 
account all relevant factors.” Del. Code tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019). Although section 262 as writ-
ten governs appraisal rights, the Supreme Court of Delaware has held that this principle 
likewise governs cash-out mergers. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). 
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not only provides a sensible resolution to control rights conflicts, but also 
comports with a long line of Delaware jurisprudence. 
